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A considerable number of developing countries which were earlier
skeptical about foreign direct investment (FDI) have, in recent times,
become more receptive to the entry of transnational corporations
(TNCs). Beginning in the late 1970s, their policies toward FDI have
become more open. A central reason behind this is their need to
_ expand exports (Blomstr6m 1990). FDI is assumed to have the
potential of making significant contributions to facilitating the
marketing of exports. The knowledge and experience of TNCs in
international marketing and their lobbying power in their home
countries can help developing countries in expanding their exports.
FDI can also contribute to their economic development through the
transfer of financial resources, as well as of technology and improved
management knowhow.
These contributions depend largely on the policies of developing
countries and the behavior of TNCs. It is often suggested that a more
outward-oriented policy is a necessary condition for the realization of
TNCs' export potential and that host country trade policies are more
important than policies toward TNCs. The four Asian NICs (newly
industrializing countries) are the most successful in transforming their
economies and creating apolicy environment that encourages export
competitiveness. More important, their trade policy regimes are less
biased against exports. Their trade orientation attracted a substantial
amount of foreign in,ccstment, which in turn contributed to their
export expansion. _ In the 1980s, they emerged as Asia's new capital
exporting countries.
1. This is particularlytrue for Singapore and Hong Kong. In the case of South
Korea, the bulk of its exporting has been done by localfirms. Until 1984, South
Korea had restrictive foreign investmentpolicies(UNCTC 1988 and Helleiner in
Singer1991).2 4 RafaelitaA. Mercado-Aldaba
Recognizing the importance of an outward-oriented policy 2
approach, many countries today are abandoning the Prebisch-type of
inward-looking strategy.They have liberalized their FDI regulations,
and introduced various guarantees and incentives. Emulating the
successful model of their Asian neighbors, the four ASEAN countries
(Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines) have embarked
on policies of deregulation, liberalization, and reforms. In the case of
the Philippines, however, the volume of FDI has failed to meet
expectations as the country compares itself unfavorably with its
ASEAN neighbors. In the 1980s, the earlywave of foreign investment
flows from the Asian NICs, as well as those from Japan, benefited
mostly Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, within ASEAN. 3
This study aims to identify the factors that may explain and help in
understanding why the Philippines has lagged significantly behind
other countries in attracting export-oriented FDI.
The paper isorganized asfollows. Section 2 provides abackground
on trade and investment policies of the government, as well as on the
overall economic and political environment in the Philippines from
2. An inward-oriented trade strategy is one in which trade and industrial incentives
are biased toward production for the domestic market. This strategy tends to rely on
discretionary interventions, so that over time, an inward-oriented trade regime is
often characterized by controls, high and variable tariff protection and quantitative
restrictions and administrative "allocations.Outward orientation, on the other hand,
emphasizes linkages to the world economy through exports and enhanced import
capacity. This strategy does not bias incentives in favor of the domestic market.
Export activities are, therefore, treated at least' as profitably as import-competing
activities. While an important principle of outward orientation is a neutrality of
incentives between production for home and export markets, it does not imply an
absence of government intervention (Bhattacharya, A, and J. Linn, "Trade and
Industrial Policies in the Developing Countries of EastAsia," WB Discussion Paper,
1988).
3. This wave of FDI flows from the Asian NICs was driven by their search for new
markets, the need to circumvent increasing protection in the developed countries,
and the appreciation of their currencies. FDI flows from Japan surged due to the yen
appreciation in 1985 aswelt asthe wage increases,scarcity of land, and the graduation
of the NICs from the GSP in 1989 (Pangestu et al. 1992),Foreign DirectInvestment inthePhilippines i_ 3
the 1940s up to the early 1990s. Section 3 gives the trends, patterns,
sources, and sectoral concentration of FDI in the Philippines. Section
4 analyzes the impact of domestic policy changes in the 1980s on the
volume and type of FDI flows. It also examines the impact of FDI on
exports. Along this line, there are questions to address. Has the
increased policy attention to export promotion led to an increased
export orientation of existing firms? Ifnot, what prevented them from
engaging in greater export activity? Section 5 compares the
Philippines with its ASEAN neighbors in terms of trade and
investment policies, as well as the characteristics of foreign firms
operating in each country. Section 6 looks at the determinants of FDI,
and assessesthe impact of FDI flows on exports. Section 7 presents the
conclusions and policy recommendations of the study.2
Overall investment Climate
in the Philippines: 1940s-1990s
THIS section provides an overview of the economic and political
environment in the Philippines, and discusses the trade and FDI
policies in the country from the 1940s up to the early 1990s..This
serves as a background for the succeeding analysis on FDI flows. Box
1 summarizes the major economic and political events affecting FDI
flows in the country.
"PARITY AMENDMENT AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTION: 1940S - MID-], 960S
The Philippines was a colony of the US for the period 1898 to
1946. Because of these traditional ties, the country's international
economic relations were very much oriented toward the US. After
independenc e in 1946, the enactment of the Bell Trade Act reinforced
the relationship between the two countries. The Act had a parity
provision which afforded the same rights and privileges to American
firms in the exploitation of natural resources and operation of public
utilities_ In 1955, the Bell Act was revised by the Laurel-Langley
Agreement which extended the parity privileges of the Americans to
all forms of economic activities in the country.
The Philippines started to adopt an industrialization policy of
import substitution when import and foreign exchange controls were
imposed in response to a balance-of-payments (BOP) crisis in 1949.
These controls were retained throughout the 1950s, and soon, a
protective system was built up through the maintenance of an
overvalued currency, defended by protective tariffs and quantitative
import restrictions.6 ,4 Rafaelita A.Mercado-Aldaba
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Box1
Chronology ofSignificant Economic andPolitical Events inthePhilippines
Year ,' : ,:,Event ,'
1945 BellTrade Act.Thisprovided for.the continuance offreetrade between theUS
andthe Philippines foraperiod of8years with gradually rising tariffs thereafter.
,:
.1949 BOP crisis
mposition ofimport and foreign exchange controls.
1955. Laurel.Langley Agreement. This accelerated theapplication ofPhilippine duties
onimports from theUSsothat 90percent Of thePhilippine.duty wasapplied by
1.965 earlier than previously scheduled. Duties would then rise to.100percent in..
1974..I : '
.1957 Adoption ofa protective tariff structure... The1957tariff changes lowered the
, .. duties on.raw materials, intermediate goods, andessential items which were not.
domestically available andraised theduties onnon-essential,, finished goods and"
' = items which could bedomestically manufactured. Thisproduced thefamiliar
escalation ofthetariff structure which hasremained until today. Thedecontnd of
imports in1960-62 allowed thistariffstructure toemerge asthedominant
protection instrument.
' 1965 Election ofMarcos
1967" RA5186:Investment Incentives Act.ThisActprescribed incentives and
..guarantees.to investments inthePh pp nesand created aBoard ofInvestment to
..carry out .its provisions. Investments inpioneer industries could betotally foreign-
.owned while investments innon-pioneer industries :.were restricted upto40
percent equity. Theownership, requirement wasrelaxed iftheenterprise proposed
.toer_ga.ge inapioneer activity orifitexp0rted==at least 70percent ofitsproduction.
it.also Offered various fiscal incentives toforeign investors inpioneer areas such'
asaccelerated depreciation, .netoperating loss carry-over, tax exemption on
imported.capital equipment, taxcredit ondomestic capitalequipment, taxcredit '
forwithholding taxon.interest, andexemption, from. allrevenue taxesexcept
income =tax. .. ,
1968 RA,,5455:ForeignBusiness Regulations Act,ThisActregulated foteign
investment whose .equity participation exceeded 30percent inenterprises that.
werenotregisteredunder theinvestment Incentives Actof 1967. Whenever
foreign equityparticipation intheseenterprises exceeded 30percent, priorForeignDirectInvestmentinthePhilippines I_ 7
, authority fromthe BOI, must, beobtained, Forinvestments, that didnot exceed 30




RA6135: Export Incentives Act:This Act wasthefirst step towards redirecting
investments awayfrom import-substituting industries ,that haddominated the
Philippine economy, itfollowed, thesame rules on'foreign ownership asRA51-86
andprovided almost thesame incentives granted tofirms registered under RA
" 5186inaddition totaxcredit onduties andtaxes paidonrawmaterials and
additional deduction ofthe-sum ofdirect labor cost andraw materials used.
1972 Declaration ofMartial Law
PD66:Export Processing Zones. RA5490 of1969 waslegislated topave the
way forthecountry's first Export Processing Zone inBataan, but noreal progress
wasmade •until PD86wasissued. Total production of firms mustbeentirely
geared forexports; incertain instances, however, andsubject totheapproval of
theEPZAuthority, 30percent ofproduction may besold inthedomestic market.
Foreign ownership Was permitted upto100 percent, however, only promoted
industries wereallowed tobesetup.
1974 Expiration ofLaurel.Langley Agreement
lg80" Trade Liberalization Program. Under aWorld Bank structural adjustment loan
(SAL), thegovernment embarked onaprogram toreduce thelevel anddispersion
_of tariff rates andremove quantitative restrictions ever aperiod of5years ending
in1985. TheProgram proceeded broadly onschedule until the1983BOP crisis.
198i Lifting ofMartial Law i:
PD1789: Omnibus Investments Code of 1981. This consolidated into asingle-
code allincentive measures to!nvestments, agriculture, andexports contained in
separate pieces oflegislation, but _idnot alter their overall thrust.
1983 BP391iAmendment ofPD1789. This reduced thenumber ofincentives under
PD1789. Itdidaway withsome of:thecapital cheapening measures suchas
accelerated depreciation andexpansion reinvestment allowances. Italso gave
strong preference toexports and substituted pedormance-bssed forcapital-based
benefits.
Aquin6 assassination
BOP crisis8 ,4 RafaelitaA. Mercado-Aldaba




. . . November coupattempt
1987 EO226:Omnibus,lnvestments Codeof 1987.Regulatedtheentry of.foreign
investment inenterprisesnotregistered underBook1oftheCodewhenever their
.equityparticipation exceeded 40 percent(insteadof30 percentin.theoldCode).
The new Code simplifiedand consolidated, previous.lawsand providedtwo
importantadditions:incometax holidayfor enterprise s,engaged in preferf'ed
:" areasofinvestmentandlaborexpensesallowance fortaxdeductionpurposes.
:i.i Augustc0uPattempt ..
, , ., ,,
1989 Nearly successfulDecember coup and persistence of rumors of further
. conspiracies. . : :
1991' RA,7042: Foreign,InvestmentAct. Liberalizedthe existing regulationsby
allowingforeignequityparticipationupto100percentinal.Iareasnotspecifiedin
: the ForeignInvestment Negative List(FINL).TheFINLhas=tllree componentlists:
A, B, and C. ListA coversareas:whereforeign participationis excludedor
restrictedby the Constitutionor specificlegislations.List B containsactivities
whereforeigninvestmentis limitedfor reasonsof defense,risk to healthand
moral,andprotectionOflocalsmallandmedium-scale enterprises. List.Ccontains
areas,of investmentin which there already•exists,an adequate number of
. enterprises toservetheneedsoftheeconomyandfurtherforeigninvestments is
•no.longer necessary.:Foreigners who do not Seekincentives and/or whose
... _ activitiesarenotincludedinthenegativelistcaninvestupto 100percentequity
' i. Simplybyregis!ering withtheSecuritiesandExchange Commission(SEC). They
. canalsoinvestupto 100percentin enterprisesthatexportat least60 percent
."' (insteadof 70 percentunderEO 226)oftheir;ou!put, providedthesedo notfall
withinListsA andB. . : .
" ":" .: ':.EO470.Designedwithina four-yearphased0wnperiodfrom July 1991toJuly
1995,EO470aimedto lowerthemaximum .tariffrate.to50 percentandreduce
. thenumberoftarifftierswithintherangeofzerominimumforrawmaterialsto50
' i ' percent.(with someexceptions) forfinished •products.
1992 Electi0[_ of Ramos
•.: L-' ' 'ForeignDirectInvestmentinthePhilippines _, 9
MARTIALLAW,EXPORTPROMOTION,ANDDEBT-DRIVEN GROWTH:
LATE1960S- 1970S
The late 1960s was marked by economic and political turmoil.
The economy again witnessed a renewal of BOP difficulties, which
led to a crisis in late 1969.To encourage foreign investment, Republic
Act (R_A) 5186 or the Investment Incentives Act of 1967 and RA
6135 or the Export Incentives Act of 1970 were promulgated. These
two Acts were the first laws aimed at streamlining and rationalizing
foreign investment policy in the Philippines. In 1968, R.A 5455 or the
Foreign Business kegulations Act was legislated to regulate foreign
investments in enterprises that were not registered under RA 5186.
After the 1969 election in which Marcos was reelected, radical
protests escalated in both rural and urban areas. Purportedly to curb
the expansion of these unrests, Marcos declared Martial Law in
September 1972.Various measures were passed reducing restrictions
on foreign investment. Earlier laws such as R_A 5186, 5455, and 6135
were amended to enhance their attractiveness.To pave the way for the
country's export processing zones, Presidential Decree (PD) 66 was
issued in 1972.
During the 1970s, the government attempted to encourage non-
traditional exports to spearhead its economic development. This,
however, fell short of expectations. The growth of non-traditional
exports became highly concentrated on a few commodities dominated
by garments and semi-conductor devices, which were heavily
dependent on imported raw material inputs as well as on export
processing zones and bonded warehouses. During this period, the
country's external indebtedness increased greatly as a result of the two
oil price shocks and the heavy borrowing fi:om the easily available
recycled petrodollars.
ECONOMICCRISIS,TRADELIBERALIZATION, ANDPEOPLEPOWER
tLEVOLUTION: 1980S - EARLY1990S
The economic and political atmosphere in the early 1980s was
turbulent, reminiscent of the situation during the late 1960s.10 _ RafaelitaA.Mercado-Aldaba
Insurgency heightened as the Marcos government was beginning to
loge its credibility and support. After the second oil price increase, the
country began to encounter serious economic problems arising from
its increasing debt service burden, declining export receipts, and low
rates of economic growth. In January 1981, martial law was lifted,
although, it made no difference in terms of the power structure of the
Marcos regime. The assassination in August 1983 of Benigno Aquino
Jr., political arch-rival of Marcos, and the resulting political
disturbances triggered capital flight and the most severe BOP crisis the
country had ever faced.
Amidst this economic and political chaos, several economic
reforms were initiated by the Marcos government. In 1980, the
country embarked on a trade liberalization program under a World
Bank structural adjustment loan.To consolidate the incentive measures
to investments and exports, PD 1789 or the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1981 was promulgated. In April 1983, major changes were
introduced in the investment incentive system through the
amendment of PD 1789 by Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 391. The
latter reduced the number of incentives under PD 1789 and did away
with some of the capital cheapening measures such as accelerated
depreciation and expansion reinvestment allowances. It also gave
strong preference to exports and substituted performance-based for
capital-based benefits (Manasan 1986 and Power 1989).
in February 1986, an aborted military coup which was turned
into a massive urban uprising by the people overthrew Ferdinand
Marcos. The new regime of Corazon Aquino succeeded in restoring
democratic institutions in the political arena, and recorded
improvements in the co.untry's economic growth, particularly from
1987 to 1989. However, the political stability of the country remained
fragile with threats from right-wing military renegades and communist
revolutionaries. Aquino's term saw a series of attempted coups and
rumored coups involving elements of the military. The almost
successful coup of December 1989 had severely damaged the
government's standing.
After 1986, President Aquino strove to complete the import
liberalization program which was suspended in 1983. Further tariffForeign Direct investment in the Philippines I_ 11
reform was legislated through Executive Order (EO) 470. To
encourage investments, EO 226 was promulgated in February 1987.
The new code simplified and consolidated previous investment laws.
Compared with BP 391, EO 226 diminished the preference for
exports, and reinstated some of the capital cheapening measures that
had characterized investment incentives prior to 1983. Thus, the
Investment Code no longer served as a counterbalance to the import
substitution bias of the protection system and was itself biased in favor
of capital-intensive investments (Manasan 1986 and Power 1989).This
tended to give the wrong signals to foreign investors.
In June 1991, R.A 7042 or Foreign Investment Act (FIA) was
legislated. This considerably liberalized the existing regulations by
allowing foreign equity participation up to 100 percent in all areas not
specified in the Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL). The FIA
provided transparency by disclosing in advance through the FINL the
areas where foreign investments were allowed or restricted. It also
reduced the bureaucratic discretion arising from the need to obtain
prior government approval whenever foreign equity participation
exceeded 40 percent (World Bank 1993).Together with the incentives
under EO 226, the Philippines was expected to be on an equal footing
with its ASEAN neighbors with respect to policies toward TNCs.
in May 1992, the democratic transition process was completed
with the election ofAquino's former defense secretary Fidel Ramos as
president. His administration initiated peace negotiations with both
right wing military rebels and communist insurgents. This move was a
major factor in the establishment of political stability during his first
year in office. However, the rise in criminality which severely affected
the peace and order situation in the country, as well as the power crisis
which resulted in hours-long blackouts, added to the negative
perceptions on foreign investments in the Philippines (see Box 1,
Appendix 1).3
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FDIin the Philippines
As in most developing countries, there islack of comprehensive FDI
data in the Philippines. Although there are currently three
government agencies4 monitoring FDI flows, their data suffer from
lack of comparability and discrepancies due to differences in
definition, coverage, and time period (Appendix 3 discussesthese data
issues extensively). The data used in this section are based on Central
Bank statistics which, notwithstanding their weaknesses, are the most
comprehensive in terms of coverage and the most complete in terms
of number of years covered.
TRENDS AND PATTERNS
This analysis is based on the FDI item in the balance of payments
computed by the Central Bank's Department of Economic R.esearch
International (DER.-I). The DER-I's definition of foreign direct
investment includes not only foreign direct equity investments but
portfolio investments as well and foreign exchange holdings of
corporations, partnerships, and banks due to other financial
transactions.
Tables 1 and 2 show that the net inflow of FDI in the Philippines
fluctuated widely. The history of economic and political instability in
the country contributed gready to this erratic trend. Table 1 presents
the FDI flows for the period between 1950 and 1969. The table
4. These are the Central Bank, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Board of
Investments.A
Table1
Net Foreign Investment Flows in the Phili_ines : 19511-1969
(in US$million)
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1956 1959
NetForeignInvestment 2 5 22 43 44 59 31 40 18 46
Inflow 2* 5* 22* 43* 44* 59* 46* 56* 55* 83*
Outflow ...... 15 16 37 37
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
NetForeign nvestment 18 -2 -27 -34 11 -10 2 49 184 130
Inflow 107 73 26 23 74 18 74 103 266 225











NetForeignDirectInvestment FlowinthePhilippines: 1970-1993 -_
(inUS$million)
Foreign DirectEquity Investment inthePhlUppines
<
Technical Fees ForeignDirect Portfolio Capital
NowForeignReinvested Debt andImports Total Investment Investment Withdrawn Net 3
Investments Earnings Conversion Converted into Abroad fromthe Inflow
Investments Philippines 5
O
1970 4 -- -- -- 4 -3 -26 -3 -28 "o
_=:.
1971 3 -- -- -- 3 -5 2 -4 -4 ._.
1972 2 -- -- -- 2 -9 -2 -13 -22 _.
1973 83 -- -- -- 83 -1 11 -29 64 03
1974 64 -- -- -- 64 0 24 -60 28
1975 116 -- -- -- 116 -1 28 -18 125
1976 91" 67 -- -- 158 -5 16 -25 144
1977 130 78 -- -- 208 14 6 -t2 216
1978 60 62 -- 8 130 -9 -1 -20 IO0
1979 62 58 -- 10 130 -38 13 -85 20
1980 75 39 -- -- 114 -86 4 -134 -102
1981 91 62 -- 90 243 -47 3 -24 175
1982 25 44 -- 124 193 -61 1 -t16 17
1983 119 26 -- 102 247 -26 7 -116 112
t984 32 15 -- 90 137 -15 -3 -102 17 •Table2 continued
ForeignDirectEquityInvesbment inthePhilippines •
TechnicalFees ForeignDirect Portfolio Capital
NewForeign Reinvested Debt andImports Total Investment Investment Withdrawn Net
Investments Eamings ConversionConverted into Abroad fromthe Inflow
Investments Philippines
1985 9 10 -- 45 64 -22 5 -30 17
1986 17 20 14 38 89 14 13 24 140
1987 34 22 287 31 374 2 19 -69 326
1988 81 17 806 13 917 25 50 -6 986
1989 93 56 306 39 494 7 372 -30 843
I990 171 28 226 24 449 0 152 -121 480
1991 130 34 273 56 493 13 212 -64 654
1992 234 42 269 46 591 6 451 -311 737
1993 334 43 193 5 575 6 955 -924 6t2
NetForeign Direct Investment inflow =Inflows- Outflows. This represents thenetincrease inforeign equity and non-equity investments plusnetincrease in
foreign exchange holdings ofdomestic corporations and partnerships due toother financiaJ transactions.
__,."





ETForeign Direct Investment in the Philippines I_ 17
shows that the year 1950, which marked the beginning of import
substitution in the Philippines, was characterized by overall increases
in the inflow of import-substituting FDI. This can be illustrated by
looking at the foreign direct investment of the US which accounts for
the bulk of FDI in the country. Table 3 reveals that US investment in
manufacturing grew rapidly between 1957 and 1966. This period
coincided with the adoption of import substitution by the government
along with the granting of parity rights to the US. Table 3 shows that
during this period, the US shifted its investment from trade and public
utilities toward manufacturing. The share of manufacturing increased
from 13.4 percent in 1957 to 34.2 percent in 1966. These investments
in manufacturing were made largely in firms producing import-
substitutes like toiletries and detergents (Colgate-Palmolive 1949),
pharmaceutic_ils (Muller and Phelps 1950 and Mead Johnson 1962),
batteries (Union Carbide 1951), aluminum products (Reynolds 1956),




1940 1950 1957 1966
Manufacturing 7.6 15.4 13.4 34.2
Transportation, communication 39.6 31.5 23.8 6.0
andpublicutilities
Trade 14.5 20.1 19.9 14.2
Otherindustries 38.3 32.9 (D) (D)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(inUS$million) 90.2 149.2 306.0 486.0
(D)indicates thatthedatainthecellhasbeensuppressed toavoid disclosure ofdataforaspecific
person orfirm.
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business
(Washington, D.C. Govemment Printing Office), various issues inMeiners, 1988.
• III II18 _ • RafaelitaA,Mercado-Aldaba
wires and cables (Phelps-Dodge 1955), paper (Kimberly Clark 1956),
dairy products (General Milk 1957 and Consolidated 1956), tires (BF
Goodrich), and electrical appliances (General Electric [GE]). 5
The early 1960s was beset by economic problems arising from the
exchange controls instituted in the last decade. Until the middle of
the 1960s, net FDI outflows were registered (Table 1). Net FDI
inflows began to rise in 1966 and reached a peak ofUS$184 million in
1968. However, this started to decline in 1969 as uncertainty loomed
among foreign investors due to the country's growing economic and
political difficulties aswell as the anticipated termination of the Laurel-
Langley Agreement in 1974.
Table 2 shows the FDI flows from 1979 up to 1993. Negative net
inflows were registered from 1970 up to 1972. With the declaration
of martial law in 1972, net FDI inflows increased steadily from 1973
to 1978, except in 1975 when net FDI inflow plunged due to the first
oil price shock. During this period, the government enacted various
measures to deregulate foreign investment. The anxieties of American
investors were relieved by the passage of a series of presidential decrees
which facilitated their divestments. Furthermore, the Central Bank
liberalized regulations on the repatriations of capital and profits and
the remittances of royalties. But as the second oil price shock hit the
world in 1978-1979, net inflows again dropped substantially from
1978 until 1980. Abroad, the 1980s witnessed a downturn in world
economic activity and sharp reductions both in international bank
lending and foreign direct investment flows.
In the early 1980s, the country was again beleaguered by
economic and political instability. Net FDI flows suffered a massive
drop with large FDI outflows registered in the mid-1980. 1986
marked the end of the Marcos era and the beginning of the Aquino
administration. From 1986 to 1988, steady increases in net FDI flows
were registered with a peak of US$843 in !988. These flows were
boosted by the government's debt for equity program. Under the
program, foreign liabilities at commercial banks could be bought at a
discount at the secondary market and the same could be redeemed at
5. AmericanPhilippineYearbook1967 published by the American Chamber of
Commerce in Constantino, R. and Constantino, L., The ContinuingPast,Manila,
1978.ForeignDirectInvestmentinthe Philippines _. 19
full peso equivalent at the Central Bank for investment in Philippine
equity. In 1988, debt conversions stood at US$806 million and
accounted for 88 percent of total foreign direct equity investment.
Investor confidence was, however, dented by the nearly successful
December 1989 coup. Amidst widespread investor uncertainty, a
renewed fall occurred in net foreign investment in 1990. Although
some recovery was observea in 1991 and 1992, net FDI flows again
fell in 1993. Net portfolio investments in the Philippines were
relatively small until the mid-1980s. Starting in 1986 net portfolio
investments increased significantly with a surge in 1992 and 1993.
SECTORAL CONCENTRATION
This analysis looks at the changes in the sectoral distribution of
Central Bank-registered foreign direct equity investments from 1973
to 1993.The CB Foreign Exchange Department is the main source of
the data used in the analysis.Table 4 shows the percentage distribution
of FDI stock based on cumulative flows. It is evident that foreign
investment in the Philippines tended to concentrate in the
manufacturing sector with its share steadily rising from 39 percent in
1973 to 48 percent in 1983 and to 53 percent in 1993. Within
manufacturing, foreign investment is concentrated in industries like
chemicals and chemical products, food processing, petroleum and
coal, transport equipment, and machinery and appliances. Although
chemicals and chemical products dominated the other manufacturing
sectors, its share continuously fell during the past six years from 29
percent in 1988 to 23 percent in 1993. The same holds for food
whose share gradually dropped from 22 percent in 1985 to 15 percent
in 1993, as well as metal and metal products whose share declined
from 13 percent in 1985 to 8 percent in 1993. Gaining in importance
is the machinery, apparatus, appliances, and supplies sector whose
share in total manufacturing went up sharply from 6 percent in 1987
to 17 percent in 1993. For the period 1982 to 1993, the share of
textiles and garments remained constant at 5 percent. In 1973, it had
a share of 13 percent which gradually declined thereafter.The share ofr,,,,3
Table4 o
DistributionofCB-Registered ForeignDirectEquityInvestments bySector A
.Cumulative Flows (Inpercent)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1_6 1987 1988 "f98_ 1990 1991 1982 1993
BanksandOther
finmciallns6tg'dmts 45.44 45.03 35.'_2 27.06 24.54 22.51 21,01 18,.81 17.00 14,95 13.66 12.94 12.25 12.90 12,66 12.41 12.13 12.15 11,61 tl.57 11.69
Banks 88.84 76.27 76.47 74.43 70.56 66.30 66,88 60,98 57,17 56,92 59.93 59.71 59,1l 62.56 62,-/8 62,78 61.48 59.69 58,21 56.00 ,5C',78
Other financial
irisl_ons 11,16 23.73 23.53 25.57 29.44 33.70 33,12 39.,02 42,83 43.,08 40.07 40.29 40,89 37.54 372`2 37,22 56.52 40.31 41,79 44.00 49.22
Mmtuf,ectudng 39.18 34.31 44.80 48.66 55.10 55.63 53,59 50.42 4920 47.23 47.02 48.35 49,10 49.05 48,.10 47,86 48.21 43.66 51.28 51.62 93.02
Chemicals _z']d
,che,_calprodu_ 9.31 15.77 11.56 15.29 22.54 29.30 29.92 29.17 29.53 29.39 27.85 27.35 26.51 28.19 29.53 28.66 27.92 27.04 25,13 24.31 23.12
Food 6.15 14.35 11.99 9.22 12.79 12.19 14,86 13.68 17.10 15,52 18.55 19.44 22,10 21.70 21,32 21,01 19.99 19.60 15,98 16.55 15.49
MetaJ and metat
products 3.55 2.19 27.67 30.37 22.11 18.12 16,48 15,80 13.62 1&45 15.29 14.71 13,13 13.0_ 12,55 12,30 11,48 10.77 9,._ 9.31 8.48
Textlesandgarr_ 12.70 11.03 &16 6.76 5.45 5.93 5.71 5.61 5,19 5.47 4.84 4.64 4.37 4.42 4,41 4,59 4.81 5.07 5.05 5.41 5.09
Transport equ_omenJ5.94 3.03 3.03 323 4.58 5.63 5.95 8,48 8.07 7,39 6.45 6.76 7.87 7.69 7,68 7.53 7.34 7.30 7.31 6.60 5.23
Pelrde,.,_, andcoal 41.78 25.67 13.83 11.31 7.37 6.05 5.11 4,60 4,61 3,95 7.26 6.74 6.18 6.24 6,10 5.98 5.55 5.17 5.01 4.57 9.61
M_'mery,_o_atus,
applia"cesands_oplies2.66 4.36 3.09 3.84 520 4.88 5.00 6,02 5.81 6.72 6.05 5.97 5.'88 8.67 5,85 5,91 8.75 9.76 17.I4 18,27 17.37
N0n-me_ic mine_ ___
products 3.16 t.95 1.43 1.77 1.59 t.9_ 1..88 2.09 2.11 2_77 2.41 2.90, 2.62 2.65 2,56 2,51 2`41 3.98 2,66 2.50 2.89 _"
Olhers 14.75 20.55 19.24 18.20 18,27 15.98 15.30 14.54 13.75 12.34 11.27 11.48 11,53 10r43 10.95 11,51 11.76 12,21 10.90 1,0.48 9.75 _>
Mining 3.25 8.26 7.81 11.22 8.48 9.34 13,51 17.57 19.50 24.54 26.02 26.64 26.44 27.16 27.46 27.14 26,73 26,06 23.95 22.30 210.43 ,m
Pebdeurn andgas 2.95 1.75 2.05 35.98 37.36 51.88 72,74 81.48 86.51 88.39 90.42 91.22 91,85 92.39 90.34 89.03 88,50 86,56 64.04 62.90 82.71 ¢o
72.36 67.85 62.98 4529 44.24 34.33 19,23 1&47 9.74 9.t4 7.54 6.91 6.38 5.88 5,62 5,55 526 5.98 4,90 4.83 4.62 0.. o
Iro,'_,o_, 6.75 34.48 28.37 15.2"714.98 11.16 6.55 4.13 2,99 1.97 1.62 1.49 1.35 1.27. 1,21 1,19 1.13 1.98 1.05 1.94 1.94 _>
Nictel 17.03 5.94 4.48 2.26 2.31 1.71 0,96 0.60 0,44 0.29 0.24 0.22 020 0.18 0.18 0.17 0,t7 0.26 0,25 0,3_ 0.31 _-
Olhers 0.00 0.08. 1.54 1.13 t.10 0.92 0.52 0.33 031 0,22 0.18 0.17 029 0.27 2,65 3,75 4,94 6.69 9,75 10.91 1t.ll 0"Table4 continued -n 0
lg'r3 1974 Ig'ts lg'/6 1977 1978 1979 lg_ 1981 1982 1983 1984 19B5 1986 1987 t988 Ig_ 1950 lg91 lgg2 1983
?_55 6.31 5.76 6.04 5.62 5.95 533 6.49 5.88 5.34 4,77 4.67 4.36 4.19 4.12 4.38 4.98 5,29 5,30 5.31 5.10
Wholesate 61.83 39.65 48.47 61,68 67.42. 68.49 71.75 78,.10 75.98 72.51 72.62 72.17 74,20 73.94 72.54 72.93 62.40 62,30 58.00 56.01 56.05 _.
Re, estate 98.48 5282 40.74 38,48 26.16 20.96 18.16 14.28 17.24 21.04 21.72 2222 22.11 2?_98 2?_95 21.20 24,59 26,11 31.73 04.59 98.00 <
2.69 7,53 10.68 7.87 6.49 9.54 10.98 7.64 6.79 6.16 5.76 5,,51 3.69 3.69 ¢11 5.87 1,3.07 11,59 1027 9.40 8.95 _._
3
0.18 0.31 1.70 2.96 2.04 2.77 2.68 255 4.13 3.34 4.05 3.85 3.96 3.93 3.89 4,50 4.39 4.28 ¢68 5.96 5.68 m
92.31 85.71 49.17 7E65 64.50 6635 71.94 75.35 64.69 77.76 71.81 71.74 6623 66,06 6627 56.57 5E55 57.55 48.89 38.26 331:_ n.
"--1
Othels 7.68 1429 ,5083 29,34 3350 3315 26.06 24.65 15.31 22.24 28.19 28.26 3377 34.00 3373 43.43 43.45 42.45 51.11 61.74 61.67
_D
PolbB¢ I_lty 6.76 333 320 ?_62 2,00 t.71 1,63 1.51 1.69 1.59 1,44 1.35 1.31 1.30 1,36 1.34 1.30 126 1.16 1,18 2.18 "(3
Cunm_ 921 9.67 21.98 19.67 20,68 1933 22.11 10.57 31.36 3399 33.00 33.38 36.60 38.28 42.89 42_54 43.95 44.78 44.68 4538 50.97 :_
Lac, db'anspod 20.49 90.68 72_,60 67.79 6544 h-'_'47 53.16 47.05 3393 33.90 32.81 32,18 2004 29,64 27.33 27.10 26.17 25.45 24.60 22.23 10.97 "5"
Ot_ers 020 0.30 6.31 12_59 13.89 17.80 24,74 33.39 34.71 32.11 34,19 34,48 3386 3?_98 29,79 30.35 29,67 29,79 30.72 30.79 30.06 "_---
('D
,*_dcCture, Finery
and _ 2.49 1.81 1.44 126 1.14 1.06 0.98 127 1.29 1.28 1.17 1.24 1.74 1.67 1.63 1_68 1.53 1.63 1,46 1.34 123
Agriculture 5.49 13.58 15.68 18,14 29.76 26.14 38.14 27.13 34.00 42.63 44.44 48_64 6563 64.63 84_81 84.28 83,59 61.09 8127 81.14 61.98
Others 94.51 68,42 84.34 81.68 70.24 73.86 63.68 7?_87 68.00 57.37 55.56 51.36 34.37 15.37 15.19 15.72 16.31 18.91 18.73 18.86 16.92
Cm_euctJon 0,06 0,06 0.05 0.68 0.12 0.98 0.83 1,34 1,16 1_09 0,95 0.90 0.63 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.70 0.56 0,63 0,70 0.56
TransporHaci_es 0.00 0.20 0.00 41.05 27,38 82,51 79.01 43.51 40.61 35.53 35.84 35.25 45.53 49.49 49.35 48.35 45.56 48.39 45.26 37.15 36,24
[nlr'astructure 0,00 O.OO 0.00 0.06 0.06 0_00 O.QO 41.77 98.98 34.11 34.40 34.26 7227 7229 72.26 72.28 7224 7"L84 72.67 61.72 60,29
Olhe_ 100.00 100.00 106.00' 58.97 72_62 17,49 20.99 14.72 20.41 30.36 29.76 30.49-28.80-20.78 20,63 20.63 20,81 20.23 17.93 1.13 3.47
Offtem 0.06 0.19 0.13 0,10 0.67 0,06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.62 0.62 0.62 0,62 0.0_ 0.62 0.,_ 0.01 0.01 0.01
TotalForeign
Eqz._blvestlmmte 100.00 106.00 106.00 100.00 100.00 105r05106.00 100.20 100.00 100.06 100.06 100.06 100.(X) 106._ 100.06 100,06 1(X).06 100.06 106.00 105.00 105,06 ,qp,
Source: Cenbal Batik of b_ePhilippines. ro
._L22 _1 Rafaelita A,Mercado-Aldaba
transport equipment increased from 7 percent in 1982 to 9 percent in
i992, but this declined to 8 percent in 1993. The share of petroleum
and coal was almost constant at 6 percent between 1980 and 1989,
dropped to 5 percent from 1990 to 1992, but rose to 10 percent in
1993.
For _theperiod 1973 to 1993, there were substantial shifts in the
overall concentration of FDI. In the beginning Of the period under
study, banking and finance was the leading sector with its share
amounting to around 45 percent in 1973 and 1974. This could be
explained by the enactment ofPD 71,which allowed minority foreign
participation in banking and finance, and PD 1034, which created an
offshore banking system in the Philippines. PD 1034 was legislated
with the objective of competing with Singapore as a financial center
in the region. However, further movements into this sector were not
sustained. Its share continued to drop from 45 percent in 1973 to 12
percent in 1993.
In 1973,public utility was the third largest sector with a share of 7
percent. But with the expiration of the Laurel-Langley Agreement in
1974, Americans began to withdraw their investments from this
sector. Between 1980 and 1992, pubhc utilities had aconstant share of
only 1 percent which increased to 2 percent in 1993. The share of
mining expanded tremendously from 3 percent in 1973 to 27.5
percent in 1987 due to large foreign investments in petroleum and
gas. Its share, however, began to drop in 1988; in 1993 it accounted
for 20 percent of total FDI.The share of commerce increased from 3
percent in 1973 to 5 percent in 1993.This could be explained by the
passage of PD 714 which exempted foreign investors engaged in
intermediate trade and bulk salesfrom the equity restrictions imposed
by R.A 1180.
The share ofservices also rose from less than 1 percent in 1973 to
roughly 6 percent in 1993. Due to the equity restrictions imposed by
the Constitution in the areas of agriculture, fishery, and, forestry, as
well as in construction, foreign investment in these sectors remained
relatively low with the share of agriculture, fishery, and forestry
shrinking from 3 percent in 197.3 to 1 percent in 1993.ForeignDirectInvestmentinthePhilippines _ 23
SOUI_CES OF FDI
The last two decades witnessed changes not only in the sectoral
distribution but also in the sources of FDI. Although still the most
important, the dominance of the US has been substantially diluted by
the increasing presence of Japan and Hong Kong, and to a lesser
extent, of South Korea and Taiwan. 6
Between 1973 and 1993 (Table 5), the share of the US declined
from 64.3 to 44 percent in I993. Annual FDI flows from the US
started to decline in 1987. The shares of Japan and Hong Kong both
increased considerably from 9.7 percent in 1973 to 20 percent in 1993
and from 1.3 percent in 1973 to 7 percent in 1992, respectively.
Substantial annual flows from Japan were registered between 1988 and
1992. Among the other Asian countries, South Korea and Taiwan
have become significant sources of FDI. Starting to invest in 1976,
South Korea increased its share from 0.01 percent to 1.6 in 1993.
Taiwan's share rose from 0.2 percent in 1977 to 0.9 in 1993.The bulk
of the flows from Taiwan and South Korea started to be felt in 1989
and 1990, respectively. In 1989,Taiwan had a share of 7 percent of the
total non-cumulative flow, while South Korea had a share of 9 percent
of the total non-cumulative flow in 1991. in 1993, Singapore's
cumulative share stood at one percent while Malaysia registered a share
of 0.3 (Table 5).
The cumulative share of the OK decreased from 16.5 percent in
1973 to merely 6.5 percent in 1993. FDI flows from the UK were the
largest in 1993, accounting for 41 percent of the total non-cumulative
flow. During the last decade, i.e., from 1982 to 1992, the shares of the
other major European countries together with Australia and Canada
either declined or remained unchanged. In 1993, Table 5 indicates
increases in the shares of Switzerland, Germany, and Luxembourg.
6. FDI fromTaiwan maybe understated.Their investmentsmay not all be reported
to the Central Bank because some Taiwaneseinvestors channel their investments











Country 1973 1974 1978 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1gel 19_ I 19e3 1964/ 1965 19e6 1987 1968 19_ t990 1g91 1992 19_3
U.S.A. 64.25 55.11 48.37 47.93 49.39 52.90 55.06 54.60 53.89 5Z62., .11 55.48 56.'[7 57.28 57.75 57.34 55.80 54.07 68.62 47.33 44.08 L
Japarl 9.66 14.79 23.54 24.22 21.72 ";9.27 17.69 16.79 14.74 15,27"14.10 .'_4.05 13.9t 13.72 13,45 13.72 14.50 15.29 18.69 21.00 20.25 1, "-
Ho_J Kong 1.33 1.44 2.14 2.78 3.86 4.06 3.79 4.32 5.95 531 5.47. 5.58 6.13 5.33 5.54 5.89 6.01 6.12 6`92 6,74 6.65
Netherlands 0,16 0.64 0,44 1.85 1:/8 1,58 1.53 1.66 2.13 4,77 4.75 4.62 4,58 4,64 4,64 4.56 4.81 4.63 4.21 3.99 3,96 -L •
U,IL 16,45 9.15 7.33 5`79 4.72 4,09 3.61 3.58 425 4,16 .3.5_ 3.52 3,40 3.72 3,62 3.57 3.44 3.50 3.52 3,28 ' 6.49
Switzerland 0.77 1.22 1,54 1,77 2.15 2,37 2.43 2.50 2.51 2,40_ 2.16 225 2,31 2,32 2.24 2.20 2.22 2.31 2.28 2,29 2,44
_ia 0.31 2.t4 2,43 2,51 2.48 2.32 2`3t 2.45 2.25 2,03 1.00 1,86 1,69 1,65 1,64 I'.61 1.92 2.04 1.80 1,78 1.64
0.34 8.60 6`66 7,82 6.97 5.72 4]9 3.94 2.92' 2,37 2,08 1,95 1.79 1,73 1.70 1.85 1.58 1.58 1.43 1,34 122
France 0.77 0.42 0.50 0,24 0.22 6.19 0,74 1.39 227 1.97 1.88 1,77 1,61 1,55 1.50 1.46 137 1.92 1.20 1,24 1.14
Republic ofNauru 0.00 0.03 0.0C 0.03 0.68 0.CC 0,00 0.03 0,63 0,52 0,48 0,43 0,39 0,37 0.58 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.27 0,29 027
WestGermany 0.18 0,32 0.23 0.33 0.65 0.92 0,91 1'.05 1,14 1.09 1.12 1,14 1.07 1,07 1.65 1.06 1,00 1.01 1.04 1,14 123
Sweden 0.03 0,03 0.13 0.45 0.53 6.51 1.06 0.91 0,80 0.71 1,07 1,03 1,62 0,99 0.00 0.94 0.65 1.62 1.05 0,00 0.92
Panama 0,1B 0,10 0.32 0.40 131 t.22 1,11 0.97 0,89 0.95 0,86 0.81 0,77 0,74 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.72 0.64 0,58 0.50
Austria 0,03 O.OC 0,00 O.OC O,O0 0,38 0.03 0.23 0,24 0.44 0,69 0,73 0,69 0,67 0.64 0.63 0.59 0.55 0.75 0,69 0.63
Singapore 0,03 0.04 0.13 0.28 0,2B 031' 0.47 0,41 0,72 0.64 0,58 0.56 0.58 039 0.38 0,40 0,49 0.65 0.83 0,95 1.09
Dennlark 022 0.16 0,19 6.16 0,35 0,38 0.53 0,58 0,49 0.71 0,64 0.68 0.55 0,50 0.54 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,53 0,48 0.48 130 • i_
L.uxembourg 0.03 3.36 2,33 1.82 1,55 126 1.04 0,87 0.71 0.65 0,57 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.40 0.45 0,45 0.48 0.40 0,38 0.53 _"
Malaysia 0.38 0.00 0,00 6,00 0.04 0,04 0.03 0,03 0.62,0.03 025 0.33 0.38 0.35 0.34 0,37 0.35 0,04 0.31 0.29 0.32 __.
Bahamas 0.58 0.32 0,03 6`32 0,01 0,02 0.02 0,01 0.01 0.01 0,01 0.38 0.32 031 0.38 029 0.27 0,26 023 0,21 0.20
NewHer)riSes 0.00 0.03 0,03 0.00 0.38 0,39 0.31 128 1.33 0:B5 0.74 0.38 0.32 0.38 0.29 0,29 0.27 0,25 0,22 020 0.19 _:>
Bermuda 0.15 0.15 0,15 0,15 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.41 0.34 0.30 0.28 0.26 025 0.24 0,29 0,28 0,27 027 025 0.31
South Korea 0.03 0,00 0.03 0,01 0.32 0,57 0,56 0.46 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.2-/' 0.26 0.25 0.24 0,24 0,27 0,49 1,40 16`I 1.56 ('c.
Tai'.s_ 0.03 0.03 0.50 0.00 0.17 024 0.22 0.21 0.17 "0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0,17 0,64 0,63 0,90 0.00 0.32




Source: Centra_ BankofthePhilippines. m
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Trade and investment Policy
Changes in the 1980s:
Impact on FDI Flows and Exports
FDI AND THE OVERALL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY REGIME
FDI can be broadly divided into three groups: local raw material
processing, import-substituting or protection-hopping, and outward-
looking FDI. Since the 1950s, the country's trade policy has continued
to provide a very strong incentive for import-substituting as opposed
to export-oriented production. Because of these incentives to import
substitution, FDI in the country has become heavily oriented toward
the domestic market and has failed to attract substantial amounts of
FDI geared to export markets.
Table 6 reveals that FDI is concentrated in the highly protected
manufacturing sector. The table shows that the manufacturing sector
has received the highest effective protection rate (EPR) since 1965.
Although this has been reduced over the years, the effective protection
that it receives still remains relatively high compared with other sectors
like mining and agriculture, fishery, and forestry, which for some years
received either negative or very low effective protection. Within the
manufacturing sector, the same pattern is evident. Table 7 shows that
FDI is concentrated in manufacturing subsectors receiving high
effective protection. Prior to the 1980 tariff reform, chemicals had
EPRs ranging from 15 to 227 percent, food 495, metal products 84,
textiles and garments 106, transport, machinery and appliances 118,
and petroleum and coal 38. Although the EPRs were reduced in the
late 1980s, effective protection still remains high particularly in26 4 .RafaelitaA. Mercado-Aldaba
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Table6
EPRand FDIConcentration,All Industries
%Share % Sharein EPR
inTotal TotalBOI-Approved EPR (price
CB-Registered Projects (tariffs) comparison)
FDI
Manufacturing
1965 ND* ND 51.00 ND
1974 34.31 ND 44.00 ND
1979 53.39 ND 58.00 ND
1985 49.10 75,71 77.00 102.10
1986 48.05 59.56 61.70 82.90
1988 47.86 76.41 62.40 75.00
1989 48,21 69.76 61.20 73,70
1991 51.28 60.86 59.50 74,10
1992 51.60 54,61 57.20 71.90
Mining
1965 ND ND -17.00 ND
1974 8.26 ND -13to 16 ND
1979 13.51 ND 0.00 ND
1985 26.44 0.93 23.60 23.60
1986 27.16 0.00 22.00 18.20
1988 27.14 0.38 17.30 17.30
1989 26.73 4.54 17.30 17.30
1991 23.95 1.45 23.00 23.00
1992 22.42 2.33 23.00 23,00
Agriculture,FisheryandForestry
1965 ND ND 17/ -26** ND
1974 1.81 ND 9.00 ND
1979 0.99 ND 1.00 ND
1985 1.74 1.55 76.50 76.50
1986 1.67 5.21 33.70 44.30
1988 1.63 7.22 35,30 45.10
1989 1.53 3.69 35.30 45.10
1991 1.46 2.95 51.10 51,10
1992 1.35 1.91 46.10 47.70
ND-- nodata.
**-26forForestry and17forAgriculture.
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Table 7
EPRandFDIConcentration intheManufacturing Sector
%Share %Share in EPR
inTotal Total BOI-Approved EPR (price
CB-Registered Projects (tariffs) comparison)
FDI
Chemicals
1965 ND ND 13to94 ND
1974 5.40 ND -7to221 ND
1979 16.00 ND 15to227 ND
1985 13.00 6.50 102.10 142.40
1986 13.50 50.70 72.40 110.30
1988 13,70 29.60 71,10 108.90
1989 13.50 4.70 71.10 108.90
1991 12.90 9.60 57.40 103,60
1992 12.60 2.50 53.00 99.20
Feed
1965 ND ND 15to400 ND
1974 4.90 ND -49to3371 ND
1979 7.80 ND -6to495 ND
1985 10.90 12.30 76.90 53.20
1986 10.40 1.20 61.00 46.30
1988 10.10 2.70 60,30 43.70
1989 9.60 1.70 60,30 43.70
1991 8.70 4.10 59.20 42.60
1992 8.60 0.50 56.80 40.30
BasicMetal Products
1965 ND ND ND ND
1974 0.70 ND 47.00 0to27
1979 6.10 ND 84.10 47to176
1985 5.20 1.60 101.60 179.60
1986 6,30 2.90 71.90 71.90
1988 5.90 3,20 73.70 73.70
1989 5.50 3.50 73.70 73.70
1991 5,00 1.50 79.80 79.80
1992 4.80 2.90 78.90 78.90
Textiles andGarments
1965 ND ND 43to330 ND
1974 3.80 ND -4to78 ND
1979 3.10 ND 106.00 ND28 4 Rafaelita A. Mercado-Aldaba
Table7 continued
% Share .%Sharein EPR
inTotal TotalBOI-Approved EPR (price
CB-Registered Projects (tariffs) comparison)
FDI
1985 2.10 1,20 136.40 337.80 "
1986 2,10 8.80 101,40 322,50
1988 2.20 6.40 120.90 120.90
1989 2,30 21.30 116.40 116.40
1991 2.60 4.00 87.50 87.50
1992 2.80 4.50 87.50 87.50
TransportEquipment, Machinery and Appliances
1965 ND ND 77to533 ND
1974 1.40 ND 9 to127 ND
1979 3,20 ND 118.00 ND
1985 3.90 67,00 72.00 96.60
1986 3,70 28,60 50.70 68.70
1988 3,70 38,30 47.80 64.40
1989 5.10 37.60 46,80 63,40
1991 8,30 18.00 42.30 58,80
1992 9.90 48.90 32,80 49.80
PetroleumandCoal
1965 ND ND 45,00 ND
1974 8.90 ND 16to21 ND
1979 2.70 ND 1 to38 ND
1985 3.00 1.40 38.80 182.10
1986 3.00 0.00 37.90 172,30
1988 2.90 0.01 46,60 171,60
1989 2.70 8.80 40,00 165,00
1991 2.60 44,60 40.00 175,90
1992 2.40 0,00 42,00 177,90
Sources (EPR estimates): Power and Sicat, 1970; Bautista, Power and Associates, 1979; Quinto, 1986;
Power and Medalla, 1966; Tan, 1994.
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textiles, chemicals, basic metal products, and processed food. This
becomes even more glaring when one looks at the EPRs computed
based on price comparisons. The latter is more meaningful since it
captures the effects ofnon-tariffbarriers which are mainly in the form
of import restrictions. For instance, in line with BOI's local content
programs, import restrictions were imposed on the appliance sector
(consumer electronics in 1975) and transport sector (cars, jeeps,
motorcycles, trucks, and buses in 1971). Furthermore, chemicals, coal,
and machinery were regulated by the Central bank for reasons ranging
from national security, public health and safety to protection of local
industry. EPR estimates on the basis of price comparisons show that
in the early 1990s, chemicals and petroleum and coal had EPRs that
exceeded 100 percent.Textiles and basic metal products had EPRs of
around 88 and 80 percent, respectively.
In principle, the investment incentives promulgated by the
government favor export production. However, data on BOI-
approved FDI projects show that these approvals are biased toward
sectors with high EPRs such as machinery and equipment, chemicals,
and transport (Tables 7 and 8). Between 1981 and 1992, the average
share of these sectors in total manufacturing amounted to 52 percent.
This leads us to conclude that the investment incentive system tends
to reinforce the heavy domestic market orientation promoted by the
trade regime. Moreover, the incentive system favors capital-intensive
over labor-intensive producers of import substitutes (Manasan 1986).
This is indicated by the increase in the capital-labor ratio for total
manufacturing from 65.6 to 110.61 between 1983 and 1988 (Table
G.9,World Bank ]993).
Because of the high level of protection promoted by the trade and
investment incentive system, foreign .competition, which could have
been provided by imports, was virtually eliminated. The result was an
inefficient manufacturing industry which was littered with infants that
never grew up and required permanent protection for survival.
Furthermore, the protection of domestic manufacturers penalized
exporters, and since the import substitution policy failed to develop
backward-linked industrialization, the export activities that thrived
had weak backward linkages. The high cost of domestically produced0
Table 8
Foreign Equity investment •
(Inpercent)
1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 t988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Agriculture, Forestry
andFishery 5.65 2,02 0.84 1,55 5.21 8,98 7.22 3.69 1,35 2,95 1,91 0,17
Mining 6,42 7,55 1,79 0,93 0.00 1.31 0,38 4.54 4.03 1.45 2,33 1.39
Manufacturing
(as%ofmanufacturing)46,63 60.85 81,64 75.71 59,56 57.43 76.41 69.76 53.20 60,86 54.81 61.29
Processed food 13,49 2.50 26.18 12.34 1,23 t2.46 2.68 1.71 2.72 4,14 0.47 2,26
Textile andgarments 6,20 0.80 1.56 121 8,81 20,04 6,38 21.33 25.39 3,96 4.47 2.44
Chemicals 46.25 0.00 t4.91 6.45 50,73 t3.85 29.63 4.70 6.57 9.55 2.47 0,94
Petroleum products 0.35 0,00 2.17 1.43 0,00 3.82 0.01 8,82 0.00 44,56 0.00 0.31
Non-metallic ::o
mineral products 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.53 0.00 0.57 0.22 0.27 0.95 1.32 0.00 0.00
Basic metalproducts
andfabricated >
metal products 6.59 0.00 17.00 1.63 2.87 0.76 3.15 3.48 1.14 1.54 2.87 11.27 _: (D
Machinery andequipment
andelectrical products 6.44 43.07 24.18 44.52 19.23 21.93 32.30 35.03 26.92 12.16 30.34 46.27
Transport 0.78 0.36 3.55 22.46 9.36 3.41 6.00 2.53 18.65 5.84 18.51 4.00 >_
Others 19.91 53.28 •10.28 8.43 7.77 23,17 19.63 22.14 17.65 16.93 40.88 32.51 ="
crTable 8 con_led -n
O
1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 -,
Public UUliUes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.90 0.13
commerce, Export





FarmServices 28.22 25.48 5.73 16.62 11.89 18.11 7.47 5.34 6.62 6.74 0.00 0.83 -o
_r"
7O
FiMncialInstitutions 0.37 0.42 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.14 0.00 O.00 0.26 0.14 O.00 0.0O
Construction and
Infrastructure 0.63 0.22 0.94 0.02 i.27 0.68 0.04 0.04 5.11 2.82 0.30 0.O0
Others 3.74 1.38 2.18 0.35 1.93 3.80 3.58 9.32 26.67 20.95 39.98 36.09
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 t00.00
Source: Board of[m_'tmenls (13OI).
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inputs discouraged exporters from sourcing their inputs locally. To
retain their competitiveness, exporters had to rely on imported inputs.
In addition to these problems, import substitution incentives led to a
misallocation of resources. The overvalued currency encouraged the
use of imported inputs, especially on those on which tariffs were low.
Since tariffs on Capital equipment were also typically low, capital-
intensive investment was encouraged. With the excessive use of
imports" and capital, labor was not utilized intensively in the import-
substituting manufacturing sector. The protected manufacturing
sector remained a net burden in the balance of payments, since the
import substitution policy only shifted dependence on imports of
consumer goods to capital and intermediate goods (WB 1985).
FDI in the Philippines was very much influenced by the import
substitution pohcy. Although the trade and investment policies were
inappropriate, foreign investors nevertheless responded to the profit
opportunities they offered by locating in the highly protected sectors
of the economy. By taking advantage of the effective protection
afforded by the tariff structure, the domestic investor, Filipino or
foreigner, could earn extremely high profitsl pay high wages, and/or
simply accommodate inefficiencies and high costs substantially above
those of foreign competitors. The higher the effective protection, the
greater the potential for inefficiencies, high input costs or profits.
The distortionary policies accompanying import substitution
resulted in investment in inefficient activities, as well as in investment
decisions by both foreign and domestic investors, which caused a
misallocation of resources and a suboptimal level of welfare.
Investments made by multinationals in the transport industry are the
prime example. This industry has been regulated and protected
through BOI's progressive manufacturing program established in the
early 1970s.The program resulted in high-cost domestic production
and failed in inducing the industry and its subsectors to compete in
the export market. The World Bank (1993) estimated the cost of
maintaining this type of protective regime for automobiles and
commercial vehicles to be around P5.2 billion a year.
The immiserization literature is often used to link trade and
foreign investment. This shows that capital flows in protectedForeignDirectInvestmentinthePhilippines _ 33
industries can lead to decreases in host economy welfare. For a small
tariff-imposing country, within the standard two-commodity two-
factor model of international trade, and assuming that foreign capital
receives the full untaxed value of its marginal product, Brecher and
Diaz-Alejandro (1977) demonstrated the possibility of Bhagwati's
immiserizing growth when the host country continued to import the
capital-intensive good while remaining incompletely specialized.
Once protection has been granted, further reduction in welfare would
result from any exogenous, as well as tariff-induced, capital inflows
from abroad. Box 2,Appendix 2 illustrates the experience of Brazil in
imposing foreign investment restrictions within the context of an
inward-oriented development strategy, and how these resulted in the
emergence of an inefficient and non-competitive industry.
FDI ^ND EXPORTS
The lack of comprehensive data7 on the exports, of TNCs greatly
impairs the analysis in this section. Data on PDI exports are necessary
in assessing the export orientation of TNCs operating in the country,
and how they reacted to the trade policy changes implemented by the
government. Notwithstanding the data limitati6n, the picture that
emerges is that although the export propensity of US TNCs,
measured by the ratio of exports to total sales, had increased, a large
proportion of their total sales was still mainly for the domestic market.
Table 9 shows that with the gradual dismantling of protection, the
export propensity of US firms increased from 16 percent in 1982 to
25 percent in 1987. However, compared with US affiliates in other
Asian countries, these figures were much lower. In Malaysia, this ratio
increased from 47 to 60 percent between 1982 and 1987. In
Singapore, the ratio remained largely unchanged at 82 percent during
7. The dataavailable arelimited to exports ofUSTNCs fromthebenchmark survey
of the US Department of Commerce and the export performance of TNCs
belonging to thetop 2000 corporations in thecountry publishedbythe MahalKong
PilipinasFoundation.03
Table 9
Export Performance ofMajority-Owned Non-Bank Affiliates ofNon-Bank USParents (MONANUS) •
USFirms'
TotalSales TotalExport Total Country Export Share of
ofMONANUS ofMONANUS Exports Propensity Total Exports
US$ million US$million US$million inpercent Inpercent
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)/(1) (5)=-(2)/(3)
1982
Philippines 3,596 564 5,020.6 15.7 11.2
Malaysia 4,319 2,046 12,031.4 47.4 17.0
indonesia 12,543 8,289 22,293.3 66.1 37.2
Thaitand 2,591 453 6,956.9 17.5 6.5
Hongkong 7,516 4,474 20,967.8 59.5 21.3
Singapore 14,1t4 11,579 20,788.0 82.0 55.7
South Korea 604 266 21,853.4 44.0 1.2
Taiwan 1,867 931 49.9
(D
1986 =:
Philippines 2,509 626 4,841.8 25.0 t2.9 >
Malaysia 3,983 2,371 13,837.8 59.5 17.1 _:
Indonesia 5,221 4,295 14,805.0 82.3 29.0 F,
Thailand 2,760 525 8,835.6 19.0 5.9
Hongkong 8,059 4,916 35,465.7 61.0 13.9 ___




TotalSales TotalExport TotalCountry Export Shareof 2
of MONANUS ofMONANUS Exports Propensity TotalExports o
US$million US$million US$million Inpercent In percent <
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)/(1) (5)=(2)/(3) o
3
(I)
SouthKorea 935 407 34,714.5 43.5 1.2
Taiwan 2,908 1,568 53.9 -"
Q)
1987
Philippines 2,798 698 5,720.2 24.9 12.2 _
7O
Malaysia 4,736 2,831 17,920.9 59.8 15.8 5
Indonesia 5,453 4,532 17,135.6 83.1 26.4
Thailand 3,391 718 11,659.2 21.2 6.2
Hongkong 9,807 5,653 48,501.8 57.6 11.7
Singapore 11,594 9,476 28,685.8 81.7 33.0
SouthKorea 1,292 606 47,206.6 46.9 1.3
Taiwan 3,758 1,815 48.3
1989
Philippines 2,905 649 7,746.7 22.3 8.4
Malaysia 5,419 2,086 25,106.5 38.5 8.3
Indonesia 6,120 2,680 22,028.9 43.8 12.2 •





Total Sales TotalExport Total Country Export Share of
ofMONANLIS ofMONANLIS Exports Propensity Total Exports
US$million US$million US$ million Inpercent Inpercent
(1) (2) (3) (4)--(2)/(I) (5)=(2)/(3)
Hongkong 16,408 8,779 73,156.0 53.5 12.0
Singapore 15,102 10,531 44,687.1 69.7 •23.6
South Korea 2,463 594 62,377.2 24.1 1.0
Taiwan 6,773 2,621 38.7
Sources:.
US DirectInvestmentAbroad:1982BenchmarkSurveyData.
USDepartmentof CommerceBureauOfEconomicAnalysis, December 'f985.
USDirectinvestmentAbroad,OperationsofUSParentCompaniesandtheirForeignAffiliates,Revised1'987Estimates.
USDepartmentof CommerceBureauof EcenomicAna_is, July1980.
USDirectInvestmentAbroad,OperationsofUSParentCompaniesandtheirForeignAffiliates,Revised1986 Estimates. _,
USDepartmentof CommerceBureauof Economic Analysis,July1989. __
m
Surveyof Current Business(July1993). 3>






the same period. Although Taiwan and Hong Kong experienced
some reductions, their ratios were still relatively high. Taiwan's ratio
declined from 50 percent in 1982 to 48 percent in 1987, while the
same ratio for Hong Kong dropped from 60 percent in 1982 to 58
percent in 1987.TNCs in these countries have played a major role in
their trade sector particularly in manufactured exports. In 1987, US
TNCs alone accounted for as much as 33 percent of Singapore's total
exports, 16 percent of Malaysia's exports, and 26.4 percent, mostly
petroleum, of Indonesia's exports. In the case of the Philippines, US
firms, which have been the country's largest foreign investors,
accounted for 12 percent of the country's exports.
Investment by US TNCs operating in the Philippines were highly
concentrated in two manufacturing sectors: electric and electronic
equipment and chemicals. The share of electric and electronic
equipment in the total manufacturing investment of US affiliates in
the Philippines increased from 20 percent in 198.2 to 28 percent in
1987. Similarly, the share of chemicals went up from 29 percent in
1982 to 35 percent in 1987. A large proportion of their manufactured
exports consisted of electric and electronic equipment, mainly in the
labor-intensive stage of semiconductor production. The share of
electronics in the total manufactured exports of US affiliates in the
country increased from 54 percent in 1982 to 65 in 1987. Texas
Instruments, a US semiconductor giant, is one of the largest TNCs
operating in the country in terms of sales. In the early 1980s, Malaysia
and the Philippines became major sites for chip assembly (UNCTC
1992). Malaysia's semiconductor exports were much larger than the
Philippines'. Table 10 reveals that from 1982 to 1987, the country's
semiconductor exports remained roughly one-fifth of Malaysia's
exports of the same.Table 10 also shows that the export propensity of
US semiconductor affiliates in the Philippines increased significantly
from 73 percent in 1982 to 92 percent in 1987. In Malaysia, the same
figure rose from 96 to 97 percent between 1982 and 1987.
The share of chemicals in the total manufactured exports of US
affiliates in the Philippines declined by half from 6 percent in 1982 to
3 percent in 1987.The export propensity of US chemical affiliates
likewise dropped from 5.2 to 3.2 percent during the same period




Chemicals andAllied Products Electric andElectronic Equipment
1982 1986 1987 1982 1986 1987
Philippines 25 9 16 242 325 376
Malaysia 12 20 15 1,283 1,614 2,068
Singapore 41 D 275 991 1,384 1,832
Taiwan 12 22 62 728 1,042 926
Hongkong 66 92 119 584 395 446
TotalSalesof MONANUS(in US$million)
Chemicals andAlliedProducts Electric andElectronic Equipment
1982 1986 1987 1982 1986 1987
Philippines 479 455 507 334 357 411
Malaysia 87 114 136 1,335 1,649 2,139
Singapore 57 277 323 1,034 1,509 2,039
Taiwan 114 222 293 821 1,085 1,019
Hongkong 211 248 348 641 471 603
ExportPropensity(inpercent)
Chemicals andAllied Products Electric andElectronic Equipment
1982 1986 1987 1982 1986 1987
Philippines 5.2 2.0 3.2 72.5 91.0 91.5
Malaysia 13.8 17.5 11.0 96.1 97.9 96.7
Singapore 71.9 D 85.1 95.8 91.7 89.8
Taiwan 10.5 9.9 21.2 88.7 96.0 90.9
Hongkong 31.3 37.1 34.2 91.1 83.9 74.0
Sources:
US Direct Invesb'nentAbroad: 1982 Benchmark Survey Data.
USDepartment ofCommerce Bureau ofEconomic Analysis, December 1985.
USDirect Investment Abroad, Operations ofUSParent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates, Revised 1987
Estimates.
USDepartment ofCommerce Bureau ofEconomic Analysis, July 1990.
USDirect Investment Abroad, Operations ofUSParent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates, Revised 1986
Estimates.
USDepartment ofCommerce Bureau ofEconomic Analysis, July 1989,
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1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
AllIndustries(in'000 pesos,current prices)
18,407.7 23,610,7 24,339.6 21,073.833,134,9 32,993.4 28,276,3
BySector(in percent)
Agriculture, Fishery
andForestry 9.6 11 128 14,2 10,9 13.3 16,7
Manufacturing 57.5 63,2 69 67.8 63.3 68,4 67,3
Electrical 20,53 19,7 27.68 32.73 23,46 33.37 26.23
Food 6,3 8.6 8,3 7,8 5.8 6.8 9,1
Chemicals 4.2 56 4,2 0.5 0.4 0,6 1 1
Textilesand
wearingapparel 3.1 5,7 10.5 9.6 8.4 12.5 13.7
Transport -- -- -- 1,0 1,5 2.8 5.1
Ironandsteel 4.2 3,9 0.9 0.9 2.9 2,5 34
Others 19,1 19,7 15.3 15,3 20.8 9,7 8.7
Mining 32,3 25.1 17,4 16.8 23,2 18,1 16
Others 0,6 0,8 0:8 12 2,6 0.1 0
ByCountry(in percent)
US 63.21 52,81 62.26 70.53 67.24 57.09 40.19
Australia -- 0,43 0,98 0.68 0,74 0.35 0,61
Austria -- 1,92 2 19 ....
Belgium 15.56 10,99 229 ....
Bermuda 0,78 0,7 0,6 ....
UK 3,58 8.39" 979 1.23 2,99 4.24 581
Canada -- -- 134 1,41 1.36 1,93 2,1
China 0.54 5,26 6,61 4.89 3,49 4.51 4.78
Netherlands 2,27 3,4 4,15 994 8,68 8,14 11.73
France 0.24 0,26 0,25 0,39 0,43 08
Germany 1,48 1.32 0,75 306 2.85 274 4,27
India -- 006 0,23 0,4 0,27 0.53 0,82
Ireland .... 0,08 0,16 0,23
Japan 10,87 12.65 7,01 6.43 9,49 17.65 24,59
Korea 0,37 0,16 0,27 0,47 039 0.36 127
Liberia -- 0,41 0.39 ....
Spain 0,31 0.21 -- -- -- 0,12 0,35
Switzerland 0,78 0.82 0.64 0.95 1.95 1.62.44
Taiwan -- 0.22 0.25 -- 0,09 0.16 --
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low. US chemical affiliates in Malaysia exported 11 percent of their
total salesin 1987. During the same year, Singapore had 85.1 percent,
21.2 in Taiwan, and 34.2 in Hong Kong.
Table 11 presents another set of TNC export data from the Top
2000 Corporations in the Philippines. Most of the export-oriented
investments were from the US, Japan, and Netherlands. These
investments were concentrated in electrical machinery, apparatus and
appliances, chemicals, iron and steel, transport equipment, food
manufacturing, and textile and garments.
The country wasable to attract FDI flows in the past because of its
protectionist policy. Our experience proved that protection
discourages exports and the efficient production of manufactures. It is
to be noted that garments and semiconductors, the country's major
exports and leading exports of Philippine-based TNCs, have not
developed strong backward linkages because of their high import
content. Raw material inputs to these products top the country's total
imports. Efficient industrialization requires the creation of strong
inter-industry linkages. In our case, our manufactured exports are
concentrated in garments on consignment and subcontracted
electronic devices which are made from raw materials consigned
abroad. The inter-industry linkages created are weak because these
exports are produced separately from the domestic economy through
export processing zones (EPZs) and bonded warehouses. In 1992,
imports of EPZs accounted for 17 percent of the country's total
imports. EPZs and bonded warehouses were established to allow
exporters to import their inputs at world prices through tax and duty
exemptions and tax credit/drawback schemes. However, these export
incentives might have only partially offset the distortions created by
the protectionist structure.These inconsistent policies may explain the
inability ofexport incentives to attract substantial export-oriented FDI




TABLE12 (together with Figure 1) shows the differences in the FDI
flows to the Philippines, Malaysia,Thailand, and indonesia. FDI flows
to the Philippines fluctuated widely between the years 1973 and 1990.
Erratic annual FDI flows also characterized the situations in Indonesia
and Thailand. However, steady increases were observed from 1987 in
Indonesia and from 1988 in Thailand. Among the four countries,
Malaysia's performance in attracting FDI is particularly impressive. Its
FDI flows showed arelatively more stable pattern with sharp increases
from 1976 to 1982 and reductions from 1983 to 1987. Like Indonesia
and Thailand, a resumption of growth was felt fi-om 1987 to 1990.
With a short-lived recovery after 1986, the Philippines experienced
increases in its FDI flows,but after reaching apeak in 1988, FDI flows
started to fall. Compared with the three ASEAN countries, the
performance of the Philippines had been disappointing.
Figure 2 gives an idea of the concentration of FDI flows during
the past 18 years, i.e., 1973 to 1990. FDI flows were highly
concentrated in Malaysia, followed by Thailand and Indonesia, while
the Philippines came last. Malaysia's high average annual flows show
that it had been the preferred site of foreign investors. Indonesia was
also an important site,but since 1989, Thailand's annual average had
outstripped the average flow of the former. Among the four, the
Philippines had the lowest average annual flow.
Table 13 reveals that most of the investments in the Philippines
and Malaysia are located in the secondary sector. In Thailand, these
are predominantly found in the tertiary sector, although since 1975,42 _ RafaelitaA. Mercado-Aldaba




Year Philippines Indonesia Malaysia Thailand
1973 55 15 171 77.
1974 4 (49) 570 188
1975 98 474 348 86
1976 126 343 380 79
1977 209 235 408 106
1978 101 219 466 51
1979 8 226 573 50
1980 (107) 179 933 186
1981 172 133 1,266 291
1982 15 226 1,393 190
1983 105 292 1,261 348
1984 9 222 797 400
1985 12 310 695 162
1986 127 258 489 261
1987 307 385 423 182
1988 936 576 719 1,081
1989 563 682 1,668 1,727
1990 530 964 2,902 2,236
Total 3,270 5,690 15,462 7,704
Average
1973-90 182 316 859 428
1973-77 98 204 375 107
1978-82 38 197 926 154
1983-87 112 293 733 271
1988-90 676 741 1,763 1,681
Sou_e:ln_rnationalMone_ryFund, Ba_n_ ofPaymen_ S_t_s,_riousissues.
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Table13
Sectoraland Geographic Distribution of FDIStock
(In percent)
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Malaysia 1988 28.3 41.2 30.5
1980 31,3 30.1 38.6
1975 39.3 30.6 30.1
Thailand 1989 9.2 42.8 48.0
1980 13.5 31.7 54.7
1975 15.1 29.9 55.0
Indonesia 1990 81,7 15.4 2.9
1980 70.4 25.4 4.2
1975 61.2 32.5 6.3
Philippines 1990 28.6 48.3 23.1
1980 18,8 50.4 30.7
1975 9.2 44.9 45.9
Distribution of FDIInwardStockbyHomeCountry
(Inpercent)
Developed CounVles All All
North Western DevelopedDeveloping
America Europe Japan Countries Countries
Malaysia 1987 12.4 46,1 33.9 59.2 40.8
11.5 49.4 30.0 58.6 41.4
Thailand 1988 31.7 19.9 47,5 77.3 22.8
40.5 22.5 36.2 80.2 20,3
Indonesia 1988 12.2 34.4 38.4 72.8 27.9
1980 6.3 14.0 48.6 77.1 22.9
Philippines1987 65.0 17.2 14.7 90.6 9,4
63.7 13.7 18.3 92.0 8.0
Source: World Investment Directory 1992, Volume 1, Asia and the Pacific. UN Centre on TNCs, United
Nations, New York, 1992.
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the share of the secondary sector had been steadily gaining ground. In
Indonesia, the primary sector, mostly petroleum, remains the most
important recipient of FDI. The table also shows that between the
1970s and 1980s, the share of the primary sector in Malaysia and
Thailand fell, while the secondary sector increased. In all four
countries, the share of the tertiary sector declined during the period
under review.
It is also evident from Table 13 that for Thailand, Indonesia, and
the Philippines, the importance of developed countries as a source of
FDI decreased, and in contrast, the share of developing countries
increased. For Malaysia, the share of developed and developing
countries remained roughly the same. Western Europe is the most
important investor in Malaysia,Japan in Thailand and Indonesia, and
the US in the Philippines.What are the factors that explain the uneven
distribution of FDI flows in the four ASEAN countries? Compared
with the three other countries, what accounts for the unfavorable
position of the Philippines asa recipient of FDI flows?
In terms of their basic investment regulations and incentive
policies, the four ASEAN countries do not differ much. In recent
years, they have liberalized their FDI policies and have opened many
sectors which were previously restricted. The four countries have
guarantees for repatriation of profits, convertibility of currency,
employment of aliens, and a guarantee against expropriation. They
also provide tax holidays, although in the case of Indonesia, generous
fiscalincentives are granted instead of tax holidays.They provide net
loss carry forward provision (except for the Philippines), export
incentives, duty-free importation of raw materials, machinery,
equipment, and parts as well as investment and expansion allowance.
A vast literature exists on the ineffectiveness of investment
incentives in attracting FDI flows.According to Helleiner, investment
incentives play a minimal role in foreign investment decisionmaking.
Incentives can never replace the fundamentals: the investment climate,
political stability, and profit opportunities (OECD 1983 as cited in
Helleiner 1991). In analyzing the effectiveness of incentives in
attracting investment flows to the ASEAN 4, Alburo et al. (1992)
pointed out that although there were no significant additions t_ theForeign Direct Investment in the Philippines _ 47
incentives granted by these countries, their FDI flows have increased
dramatically. Looking at the same issue, Manasan (1988) computed
the impact of investment incentives on a hypothetical firm's user cost
of capital and internal rate ofreturn. She found that ASEAN countries
are generally competitive before and after incentives. She concluded
that "these countries are wasting away precious government revenues
in exchange for an edge that is largely illusory."
The nfid-1980s witnessed economic liberalization in Malaysia,
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Except for the Philippines,
the three ASEAN countries vigorously pursued outward-looking
strategies. The major economic policies consisted of the liberalization
of import restrictions, promotion of foreign investment, particularly
in export-oriented _activities,adjustment of the exchange rate to
maintain competitiveness, sand liberalization of the financial system to
facilitate trade and investment flows (Chintayarangsan 1992). The
implementation of these economic changes occurred at a time when
Japan and Taiwan were relocating their labor-intensive industries and
were investing abroad.This explains the huge FDI inflows in the three
ASEAN countries after the mid-1980s.
Table 14 shows the direct investments ofJapan in the ASEAN 4.
In 1980, total Japanese investment in the Philippines was valued at
US$615 minion, a respectable figure, in contrast with Thailand,
US$396 million and Malaysia, US$650 million. Indonesia, which has
been Japan's most preferred site,had a total investment of US$4,424
million. In subsequent years,Japanese investments quickly expanded
with Thailand and Malaysia becoming very important destinations.
Table 15 presents the direct investments of the US in the four
ASEAN countries. In the 1960s and 1970s,Malaysia andThailand did
not claim a large portion of US direct investment. In the 1960s, US
8. International competitiveness summarizes an economy's success in world markets,
generally asan exporter ofmanufactured goods. It is determined by the ability of the
enterprises located in that country to produce goods and services that are more
att_actve than those of competitors, and the ability to take advantage of changing
opportunities in the internal marketplace to sustain that attractiveness (World Bank






Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Philippines
1973 341 126 34 43
1974 376 48 31 59
1975 585 52 14 149
1976 929 54 19 15
1977 1,185 150 135 183
1978 610 48 32 53
1979 150 33 55 102
1980 529 146 33 78
1983 374 140 72 65
1984 374 142 119 46
1985 408 79 48 61
1986 250 158 124 21
1987 545 163 250 72
1988 586 387 859 134
1989 631 673 1,276 202
1990 1,105 725 1,154 258
1991 1,193 880 807 203
1992 1,676 704 658 160
Cumulative Total 4,424 650 396 615
FY1951-1980
Cumulative Total 11,540 3,231 4,422 1,580
FY1951-1990
jr
Source:Ministry ofFinance, Japan. Monthly Finance Review,
Research and Planning Division, Ministers' Secretariat,
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Table15
Cap_alExpenditures byMajority-Owned ForeignAffiliatesof USCompanies
US$million)

















1982 1,963 681 192 252
1983 1,948 493 171 410
1984 1,182 460 157 366
1985 1,176 357 114 192
1986 1,114 360 129 82
1987 1,046 451 144 98
1988 851 485 145 259
1989 1,214 616 181 311
1990 970 828 181 377
1991 1,166 919 187 413
1992 1,801 932 266 621
1993 2,326 !,017 346 809
Average
1982-1992 1,396.4 633.3 184.4 349.2
Souse: US Department of Commerce, SurveyofCu_entBu$_ess, Ma_h 1977, 1987, and 1993,50 _1 Rafaelita A.Mercado-Aldaba
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direct investment was highly concentrated in the Philippines. Starting
in 1970, however, the US started to invest heavily in Indonesia. In the
1980s, Malaysia andThailand began to emerge as important recipients
of US capital. The average annual investment flow of the US for the
period 1982 to 1992 stood at $1,396.4 million in indonesia, followed
by $633.3 million in Malaysia,$349.2 million in Thailand, and $184.4
million in the Philippines.
The depressed economic conditions and political instability in the
Philippines are central reasons for the sluggish FDI flows, in addition,
the persistence of a trade policy regime that is biased toward import-
substitution and that defends an overvalued currency has prevented
the flow of export-oriented FDI. Unable to utilize its exchange rate
policy asaggressivelyas its neighbors, the country is unable to make a
genuine switch to an export-oriented type of industrialization.
Indonesia, like South Korea, deliberately undervalued its currency to
boost exports. Both theory and the experience of itsAsian neighbors
show that, ceteris paribus,countries pursuing export-oriented strategy
rather than import substitution are likely to attract more FDI. The
Philippines has been seeking to attract export-oriented FDI in a
context where there is a high level of protection in the economy.This
makes it difficult to export and to attract more FDI into export-
oriented activities. As such, FDI in the Philippines has remained
import-substituting.- 6
i # Q • • • o # # # • • t, t _ # Q B • m _ _ o _ i i m • o
RegressionAnalysis
ON_ of the early attempts to explain the determinants of FDi in the
Philippines was done by Subido (1974). Based on a time. series model,
her regression results showed the rate of return as the most significant
explanatory variable. Employing the regression technique, Lamberte
(1993) found the real GNP growth rate, real effective exchange rate,
and wage-productivity' differential to be significant determinants of
FDI flows in the Philippines.
The analysis in this section is based on two steps. First, the
variables which may be statistically associated with total FDI and
country-specific FDI are examined. For the latter, three equations are
estimated for three selected source countries, namely, the US, Japan,
and the EC 6 (UK, Netherlands, Germany, France, Luxembourg, arid
Denmark). Second, the relationship between FDI and exports is tested
by the hypothesis that FDI flows stimulate our exports.
DETERMINANTS OF FDI
Market Size and Market Growth
Most studies suggest that FDI is a positive function of output and
growth in the host country. Output is approximated by the size of the
market, usually by the GDP or GNP of the host country, while market
growth is measured by the GDP or GNP growth rate. In empirical
analyses, GDP, GNP, per capita GNP, and GNP or GDP growth rates
are often used as surrogates for market size.The size of the market and
its potential growth can signal the attractiveness of the host country as52 41 Rafaelita A,Mercado-Aldaba
a site for FDI. It should be noted that the size and growth of the
market of the host country are likely to influence FDI concentrated
on the production of goods for the domestic market rather than for
the world market. Access to a large domestic market is important to
import-substituting FDI but isnot necessary for export-oriented FDI.
Size and access are guaranteed through import protection. For
outward-oriented FDI, international competitiveness and stable
exchange rates are the more important considerations.
Real EffectiveExchangeRate
In its general form, the.real exchange rate is defined asthe price in
real terms of a realforeign currency acountry usesfor its international
transactions.The real exchange rate KER, can be expressed as:KER
= En * Pw/Pd where En is the nominal exchange rate expressed in
units of domestic currency per unit of foreign exchange, Pw is the
price deflator for the foreign currencg and Pd is the deflator for the
domestic currency.The consumer price index (CPI) is used asdeflator
for the domestic currency. As regards fhe deflator for the foreign
currency, ameasure of the price level of international goods is needed.
The CPI isnot a good measure because it includes the prices of many
domestic services and home goods. Instead, the wholesale price index
(WPI), which is heavily weighted with tradable goods,is used asproxy
for such an index.
An increase in the PER implies areal depreciation while adecline
implies a real appreciation. The concepts of overvalued and
undervalued currencies are frequently used to refer to situations in
which the real exchange rate is considered to be "too high" or "too
low" respectively, in relation to its "correct" or "equilibrium" level.
Many variants of the real exchange rate are possible,depending on
what analysts want to emphasize. For our purposes, a trade-weighted
real exchange rate known as real effective exchange rate (PEER) is
used. The REEK is an indicator of the competitive position of a
country with regard to its main trading partners. The real effective
exchange rate REEK, is defined as follows:
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where
wj -- trade weight of partner country j;
Enj = number of units of domestic currency per unit of
foreign exchange j;
Pwj = price level of partner country j; and
Pd= domestic price level.
With unchanged exchange rate and constant foreign prices, an
increase (decrease) in domestic prices or an appreciation (a
depreciation) of the domestic currency constitutes a decline (an
increase) in the country's competitiveness and is expressed by an index
fall (rise). A persistent fall (increase) indicates an overvaluation
(undervaluation) of the domestic currency, which makes domestically
produced goods and services more (less) expensive than goods and
services produced abroad. If the exchange rate does not equalize
production costs among different countries, there is a potential
disincentive (incentive) for foreign direct investments to flow in to the
country with an overvalued (undervalued) currency.
InfrastructureAvailability
Infrastructure availability -- roads, ports, airports,
telecommunication networks and facilities, energy -- also affects the
attractiveness of a country as a site for FDI. A country with poor
infrastructure may have difficulties in capturing a significant amount
of FDI.
Trade Policy
International trade policy is important in promoting a wider role
for FDI. Foreign investors will respond to the profit opportunities in
the economy arising from the country's trade policy. The type of FDI
that a country attracts can be influenced by the type of trade policy
that the country pursues. A protectionist trade policy with an anti-
export bias implies a greater incentive for domestic production and
encourages the establishment of import-substituting FDI.54 _1 RafaelitaA, Mercado-Alclaba
PoliticalStability
Domestic political stability plays a crucial role in attracting FDI.
Political risk is associated with producfon disruption, confiscation or
damage to property, threats to personnel, changes in macroeconomic
management or the regulatory environment. Because of these, foreign
investors will not risk their capital in an environment that isperceived
to be unstable.
GovernmentIncentives
Another determinant of FDI flows are the fiscal incentives
provided by the host country. These include tax holidays, accelerated
depreciation, and other investment allowances and subsidies which are
believed to encourage FDI. However, some studies found that
government incentives have a statistically insignificant effect on the
inflow of FDI. The major explanation for this cancellation of the
positive effect of incentives is that, in most cases, incentives are
accompanied by a number of disincentives like restrictions on size,
ownership, location, dividends, and entry into certain industries, as
well as mandatory provisions concerning local purchases and expom
(Balasubramanyam 1984 as cited in Weng, 1990).
The above variables are operationalized as follows:
(1) The market size of the Philippine economy is approximated by
the country's real gross domestic product GDP (1985 .prices).
(2) The real exchange rate is given by the real effective exchange rate
R_EER_ 9index (1985=100).
(3) Infrastructure availability is represented by the stock of public
investment PUBINV (1985 prices) which refers to buildings or
construction and machinery or equipment expenditures of the
9.Therealeffective exchangerateindex(REER)isthenominaleffective exchange
rate (NEER) multiplied by the ratio of the wholesale price index of the countries
whose currencies comprise the NEER basket to the Philippine consumer price
index.The NEER is a 15-year trade weighted average exchange rate of the peso vis-
a-vis the basket of foreign currencies composed of the US dollar, Japanese yen,
German DM, UK pound, South Korean won, Canadian dollar, Australian dollar,
Belgian franc, and the Danish krone.ForeignDirectInvestmentinthePhilippines i_ 55
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government reported in the National Income Accounts.The stock
of public investment is derived using the perpetual inventory
method. 1°
(4) Trade restrictions are the principal instruments of industrial policy.
Effective protection rates (EPRs) computed on the basis of non-
tariffbarriers are used to measure the restrictiveness of trade policy.
Unfortunately, this kind of assessment is limited by the paucity of
data. Instead, the average EP1Ls of the manufacturing sector,
calculated on the basis of tariffs, are used as proxy for the
restrictiveness of the country's trade policy (in percent).
(5) Since there are no continuous representations available, a dummy
variable is used to represent political instability, POLDUM, which
takes a value of 1 if a certain year is characterized by political
instability and 0 otherwise. Political instability is defined here as
uncertainties and negative perceptions arising from mass unrest,
demonstrations, political assassinations, anticipated and
unanticipated government actions, as well as government
discontinuities which may be brought about by left_-wing or right-
wing rebellion. The years 1984, 1985, 1989 and 1990 are chosen
as political dummy variables.
(6) A dummy variable is used to represent significant changes in
government incentives policy, CHIP, which has a value of 1 if
liberalizing changes in incentives policies are announced by the
government in a certain year and 0 otherwise. Investment incentive
laws in the Philippines have been changed several times to keep
the domestic climate as attractive as possible. To analyze the effect
of these changes, the years 1983 and 1987 are chosen as dummy
variables. BP BLG 391 was promulgated in 1983 while EO 226
was legislated in 1987. These two laws represent the most significant
changes in the country's investment incentives.
It is assumed that a positive relationship exists between FDI and,
(1) the size of the host country economy as expressed by GDP;
(2)KEEP.;
10. K = K_1- K_ 1* d + Glt where K is capital stock in period t, K q is capital stock
in period t-l, d is assumed rate of depreciation, and G[ is gross investment in
period t. See Tan, E.S. in "Estimating the Shadow Price of Capital," unpublished
paper, 1993.56 _1 Rafaelita A. Mercado-Aldaba
(3) PUBINV;
(4) EPR, protection encourages the flow of FDI toward the domestic
market; the higher the effective protection, the greater the incentive
to invest; conversely, a decline in protection results in a reduction
in this type of FDI;
(5) CHIP; and
(6) a negative relationship exists between FDI and POLDUM.
Multiple regression analysis is employed to estimate the
relationship among host country economic variables, political risk,
and total FDI. FDI from the US,Japan, and the EC6 are also regressed
on the same host country economic and political variables. It is
expected that there will be some delay between the decision to invest
and the completion of the transaction.The FDI model was tested with
explanatory variables containing lagged values.
Several alternatives were applied in estimating the relationship.
First, the dependent variable used was the ratio of FDI flows from
each investor country to total FDI flows in the Philippines (in
percent) .This was regressed on the following explanatory variables (all
in percent): three-year moving average of real GDP growth rate, two-
year moving average of the real effective exchange rate index, three-
year moving average of the real growth rate of public investment stock,
effective protection rate, political dummy, and investment incentive
dummy. In the second alternative, the dependent variable used was
the share of manufacturing FDI to total FDI (in percent) and this was
regressed on the same explanatory variables. However, the results were
found to be unsatisfactory in terms of fewer significant coefficients, as
indicated by lower t-statistics, and lower adjusted R 2. In order to
improve the specification of the model, the logarithmic form was
employed. A linear relationship of the logarithmic FDI model is
assumed as follows:
In FDI t = O_ 0 + B1In GDP_ k + B2 In REER t + B3 in PUBINV_ k
+ B4 In EPR - BsPOLDUM t + BcCHIP,_ k +_tForeignDirectInvestmentinthePhilippines _ 57
where t = year 1.... n;
OC o = constant
_t = error term;
FDI = foreign direct investment flows (1985 prices in
million pesos);
GDP -- real gross domestic product (1985 prices in million
pesos);
REER = real effective exchange rate index (1985=100);
PUBINV = stock of public investment (1985 prices in million
pesos);
EPR -- average effective protection rate of the
manufacturing sector (in percent);
POLDUM = dummy variable representing domestic conflictive
events in the Philippines, it is equal to 1 for year t --
1984, 1985, 1989, and 1990;
CHIP = dummy variable representing changes in investment
incentive policies, it is equal to 1 for t = 1983 and
1987.
This equation is first tested using the log of country-specific FDI
as dependent variable. USFDI, JAPANFDI, and EC6FDI are the
direct investments of the US, Japan, and EC6, respectively (in million
pesos at 1985 prices). Another equation is estimated with the log of
total FDI in the Philippines (in million pesos at 1985 prices) as
dependent variable. The regression results are presented in Table 16.
The coefficients are the elasticities of the relevant variables with
respect to the relevant FDI flows.
The empirical results provide strong support for the importance of
EPR, GDP, PUBINV, 1KEER, and POLDUM as determinants of
total FDI in the Philippines. As hypothesized, the Total FDI variable is
positively correlated with effective protection rate, real GDP, stock of
public investment, and real effective exchange rate and is negatively
correlated with political instability. The results for the country-specific
FDI point to the importance of effective protection_rate and the stock
of public investment. Both variables play a role in explaining FDI





(i) (2) (3) (4)
Variables USFDI JapanFDI EC6FDI TotalFDI
Constant -26.559"** -35.953"* -8.893 -20,504"**
(-4.02) (-2.62) (-1.05) (2.83)
LNEPR 0.637** 1.716"** 1.716" 0.651"*
(2.38) (2.96) (2.06) (2.31)
LNREER 1.622'** 0.636 0,232 1.08"
(3.36) (0.66) (0.37) (2.0)
LNGDP 1.680"** 2.011" 0.315 1,334"*
(3.12) (1.75) (0.46) (2.39)
LN PUBINV 0.310"* 0.657* 0.727*** 0.444***
(2.23) (1.91) (4.07) (3.17)
POLDUM -0.150* -0.393** -0.048 -0.197*
(-1.70) (-2.14) (-0.42) (-1.83)
CHIP -0.077 -0,220 0,023 -0.1
(-0.720) (-1.01) (-0.17) (-0,81)
AdjustedR2 0.964 0.869 0.945 0,946
F-STAT 81.004 21.946 52.081 53.882
Forthecountry-specific equations (equations 1-3), thedependent variable isthelogofforeign direct
investment ofeachinvestor country described inthetext. ForthetotalFDIequation (equation 4),
thedependent variable isthe logoftotalforeign direct investment inthePhilippines. Thenumbers
fromcolumns 2to5 arethebetacoefficients andthenumbers inparentheses aretheir
corresponding t-statistics, Thesample period is1973-1992.
*** significant atthe1percent level(two tails)
** significant atthe5percent level(_'otails)
* significant atthe10percent level(two tails).
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For both total FDI and FDI from the three countries under review,
the results show that the effective protection rate plays a significant
role in attracting FDI.This supports the hypothesis that high EPRs are
likely to discourage trade movements and thereby encourage the
establishment of affiliates to serve the domestic market.
The results also point to the importance of the stock of public
investment as a determinant of total FDI and FDI flows from the three
countries under study.The statistical results reveal a significant positive
effect on the inflow of total FDI as well as FDI from the US, Japan,
and the EC.This confirms the hypothesis that the presence of adequate
infrastructure is important for the inflow of FDI.
The statistical results for the three •countries differed with respect
to the remaining variables. Although the GDP and political dummy
variables have the expected signs for all three countries under study,
they are statistically significant only for the US and Japan. FDI flows
fromthese two countries are positively correlated with real GDP and
negatively correlated with political instability, As hypothesized, the
statistical results yield a significant positive relationship between
American FDI and R.EER, indicating that a real depreciation of the
currency has a positive effect on FDI flows from the US or an increase
in competitiveness encourages the inflow of FDI from the US. In the
case of Japan and the EC, the PEER variable has the correct sign but
is insignificant.
Contrary to the hypothesis, the coefficient of the CHIP variable
has an insignificant t-value for both total FDI and country-specific
FDI. This implies that the 1983 and 1987 changes in investment
incentive policies did not have a significant statistical effect in
attracting FDI flows. This may be because government investment
incentive policy changes had little influence on foreign investors who
were more strongly motivated by political and economic conditions.
FDI ANDEXPORTS
In general, FDI flows to a specific host country are either meant to
produce for the local market or to establish the host country as an60 4 Rafaelita A. Mercado-Aldaba
export base. The results of the previous analysis suggest that the
Philippines is very responsive to the rates of effective protection. This
may be due to the inward-oriented nature of multinational firms
which are operating in the country.To determine whether these firms
contribute positively to the country's exports, two equations which
look at the relationship between FDI and exports are tested. In the
first, the explanatory variables are denoted by the shares of FDI flows
from the US, Japan, and the EC6. In the second, the explanatory
variable is given by the share of manufacturing FDI to total FDI. To
improve the specification of the models, the real effective exchange
rate REER is included in the equations. The dependent variable is
given by the share of manufactured exports. The first equation is as
follows:
X = o_ o + B_USFDISH + B2JAPANFDISH i. + B3ECFDISH +
13 4REER + I1
where 0c{_= constant;
t = year 1, .... n;
]1 = error term;
X = ratio of manufactured exports to total
Philippine exports (in percent);
REER = real effective exchange rate index (1985=100);
USFDISH = share of US to total foreign direct investment in
the Philippines (in percent);
jAPANFDISH = share of Japan to total foreign direct investment
in the Philippines (in percent);
ECFDISH = share of EC6 to total foreign direct investment
in'the Philippines (in percent).
In the first equation, the ratio of manufactured exports, X,is
regressed on country-specific FDI and REER. In the second, the
share of manufacturing FDI to total, TOTFDISH, is subtituted for
c0untry-specific FDI variables. The beta parameters are expected to
be positive. The results of the OLS estimation are shown in Table 17.
The coefficient of manufacturing FDI, TOTFDISH,is positive asForeignDirectInvestmentinthe Philippines I_ 61
expected, but is not significant. This result reinforces the earlier
observation that FDI in the country is largely import-substituting.
However, it can be observed that the coefficients of country-specific
FDI are negative and are statistically significant at 1 percent (for the
US and Japan) and at 5 percent (for the EC6) levels.This runs contrary
to our assumption that there is a positive relation between exports and
FDI flows from the us, Japan, and the EC.The negative sign of their
coefficients suggests that FDI flows lead to a deterioration of our
exports. This could be an indication of the anti-export orientation of
FDI flows from the US,Japan, and the EC6.This also reflects that FDI
flows from these countries are directed to the domestic market and are
intended to substitute for imports instead of complement the country's
exports.These results confirm the earlier finding on the prevalence of
protection-hopping FDI in the Philippines. For both equations, the
remaining variable, R_EER, is positive and significant. This indicates
that an increase in competitiveness or a currency depreciation
encourages our exports.62 4 RafaelitaA. Mercado-Aldaba
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•Adjusted R2 0:643 0.896
F-Star 9.103 52.416
Thedependent variable istheratioofmanufactured exports tototalexports. Thenumbers from
columns 2to3 arethebetacoefficients andthenumbers inparentheses aretheircorresponding t-
statistics, The.sample period is1973-1992.
•** significant atthe1percent level(two tails)
• ** significant atthe5pe_rcent level(two tails) ........
• Significan tatthe10percent level(two tails).
II I I IIIIII I I " IIIII I I ii
• ... , , , : . . , _ ..
i .
,, • ".. ,'. . .., . .' . ."..
• . . • . .. ,- • . • . .
,. • , . .
, . . ..- ,..
" • , • • "" :' . • " '- , ": " .... " • ' , " .i " " "_ .... '7
• • # # • Q • -i • • # # # # • Q • ..ll _ o o # i o o _
••• Conclusions and •Policy
Recommendations
. Foreigninvestmenthasplayed a key rolein theindustrialdevelopmentof many
countriesthroughout the world. It is not, however,a magicwand that will
eliminate theproblemsofpoverty and underdevelopmentin a singlestroke.
PROSPERITY PAPEKS
, "_ .- .., ..
THIs paper has shown that trade policy plays an important role in
• influencing the type of FDI that the country attracts. Since our trade
policy has continued to provide strong incentives to import-
substitution, FDI in the Philippines has become heavily oriented
toward the domesticmarket and the country has failed to attract
substantial amounts of export-oriented FDI. The high level of
protection promoted by thetrade and investment structure, however,
resulted in an inefficient manufacturing industry. Although the
protectionist policy was inappropriate, multinationals nevertheless
responded to the profit opportunities it offeredand set up inefficient
local production in industries where the country did not have
comparative advantage. This investment decision by both foreign and
domestic investors dearly entailed a misallocation of resources and a
loss of consumer welfare.
Four facts stand out in the paper:
(li FDI flows to the Philippines have been largely concentrated in
..... the manufacturing sector, particularly in the following highly
_rotected industries: chemicals, processed food, transport
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equipment, machinery and appliances, textiles and garments, basic
metal products, and petroleum and coal.
(2) The investment incentive system tends to reinforce the import-
substituting nature of the economy. BOI approvalsare biased to
sectors receiving high protection and toward the capital-intensive
production of import substitutes.
(3) The appliedregressionanalysissupportsastrongpositive correlation
between FDI and the level of effective protection. The statistical
results also reveal significant positive relationships between total
FDI and the stockof public investment,realgrossdomestic product,
and real effective exchange rate.As expected, total FDI has a
significant negative relationship with political instability.The same
resultsare obtained for the US. FDI flows from this country have
been responsive to EPR, PUBIN_, GDE REEK, and political
instability.FDI flows fromJapanare influenced by EPR, PUBINV,
GDP andpoliticalinstability.FortheEC6, onlyEPR and PUBINV
aresignicant.The variable CHIP does not adequately explain FDI
flows. Since it is not a significant inducement to FDI, the
government should instead use tax revenues/otherwise foregone
in the form of incentives, to develop much needed infrastructure
in the country.
(4) The empiricalanalysisprovidessupportforthe negative relationship
between exports and FDI flOWS from the US,Japan, and the EC6.
The resultobtained fortotal manufacturingFDIand exports reveals
an insignificant positive sign. This indicates the anti-export
orientation of FDI flows, and may reflect the fact that these FDI
flows areinward-oriented andareintended to substitute forimports
instead of complementing our exports. Given this effect of FDI
on exports, it is necessary to reexamine the country's export
incentives and export strategy side by side with its trade policy
which continues to promote import-substituting industries. Unless
these inconsistent policies are corrected, export incentives alone
may not be effective in attracting export-oriented FDI. Export
incentives may only partially offset the distortions created by a
protectionist structure. If FDI is expected to significantly increase
the country's exports, then policies at alllevels must make exports
attractive.Foreign DirectInvestment inthePhilippines b, 65
If the domestic market is not protected by high import barriers,
then foreign investment islikely to be geared toward exports aswell as
the domestic market. But with the high level of protection in the
economy, it becomes difficult to encourage exports and export-
oriented FDI. Moreover, the restrictive trade regime tends to limit the
contributions of multinationals to the economy. As Naya and
R.amstetter (as cited in Ramstetter and James 1992) asserted, the
promotion of free trade isthe single most effective way of maximizing
the benefits that multinationals offer. Unless a policy environment
that encourages competitiveness and economic efficiency is created,
•the country will not be able to attract substantial amounts of export-
oriented FDI.
With the decline •in commercial bank loans and foreign aid,
developing countries like the Philippines have to rely more on foreign
direct investment to sustain their economic growth. Unfortunately,
the task ahead is not made any easier by the world economic
environment. Given the collapse of the Soviet Union, the market
transition among the Eastern European countries, and the opening up
of Vietnam; competition for resources and markets will be intense.
Recent global developments like the creation of the European Union
and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) implies that
competition in the industrialized countries will be fierce. As a result,
TNCs will always be in search for new markets to develop.
Developing countries which havepursued the appropriate policies are
most likely to capture these foreign investments. Countries pursuing
export-oriented strategy rather than impori substitution are more
likely to lure FDI flows whichare geared toward industries where the
countries have a comparative advantage. The prospects for an increase
in FDI flows to the Philippines appear promising in view of recent
reports on the current level of interest in the country among potential
investors. However, the extent to which the potentials are realized
depends ultimately on our attitude toward FDI and on our economic
and political environment.
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Why Others AreHesitant toInvest inManila
Motorola Philippines isaPara_aque-based export-oriente dUScompany tha t
manufactures semiconductors. Atruck filled with 12,000 liters ofwater goes around the
plant eight timesaday. Thedeep wellintheParafiaque plant hasdried upandwater is
hauled from thecompany's plant inCarmona, Cavite. Motorola also generates itsown
electricity. Brownouts lasting from fourtoeight hours daily forced thecompany tobuy its
fifth generator setcosting half amillion USdollars. Motorola hadplanned toinvest US$30
million toexpand itsmanufacturing operations ina 19-acre lotinCarmona. However,
these plans wereshelved duetothe1989coup attempt.
Like Motorola, Toyota Motors' auto transmission plant inSta. Rosa, Laguna is
supported byaUS$5million, five-megawatt power generator. Both Motorola andToyota
have been operating inthecountry forquite some time anddespite thebrownouts, rash of
kidnappings, andother problems; they. arenotwithdrawing because they areconfident
that they know thecountry wellenough tobeabletomanage thesituations. According to
thegeneral manager ofMotorola, %'hile thePhilippines isAsia's economic laggard,
investors areaware ofitsgrowth potentials, itscentral location, anditsabundant
resources." Thepresident ofToyota Motors says that "the company will notwithdraw
because there isamarket forToyota vehicles inthecountry." Butheadded thatffor new
Japanese investors, thePhilippines isavery dangerous andhigh-risk country because of
news about kidnappings andpastcoupattempts." Hecites vehicle parts companies as
examples ofinvestors that thePhilippines hadlost. =These companies manufacture
airconditioners orradiators, export products which can easily behandled byskilled
Filipino workers. Butinstead oftheshaky Philippines, these Japanese companies chose
tolocate toother ASEAN nations."
Condensed fromSelirio, G.M."ATough Breed," TheManilaChronicle, Jan.30-Feb. 5,1993
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Box2
HowNotToPromote AnIndustry: TheBrazilian Experience
In1979:thegovernment ofBrazil created theSpecial Secretary ofInformatics (SEI)
to regulate thecomputer manufacturing industrY. Foreigners werenotallowed inthelower
' endofthe.marke:t i.e.,: personal computers andperipherals. Imports werebanned and
foreign participation.even through minority stakes in.joint ventures wasnotpermitted.
Between 1979and 1988, domestic sales increased fromUS$120million toUS$3billion
whilel-NCs.market share, dropped, from77percent .to 33percent during the. sameperiod.
Despite thisapparent success, anumber ofproblems intheBrazilian computer industry
emerged bythelate1980s. Inprohibiting theentryofforeigners, theSEIoutlawed a
majorvehiclefor technology transfer inatechnology-driven industry thatchanges rapidly
inresponse totechnological development, Thus, whenBrazilian manufacturers started to
replicate foregntechnologies, foreign competitors haddeve opedmoreadvanced ..
technologies, leaving theBrazilian firmsinaperpetual stateofobsolescence and
' noncompet tveness. Moreover local firmshadlittleincentive to.pursue technological
innovation because theyhadthe. domestic market alltothemselves anddidnothaveto
face foreign competition. ..
, ,, ,, • • , ,,,
' .AlthoUgh themarket reserve policy created alocalcomputer industry, itwas
inefficient andgenerated products oflower qualityandhigher costthancouldbeobtained
intheinternational marketplace.. Furthermore, local firmsinotherindustries thatrelied on
microcomputers hadnorecourse t0thesuperior foreign products andwerethusforced to
usethelocally manufactured ones. This,inturnlhampered theirowncompetitiveness, as
foreign firmsinthesameindustries hadaccess tosuperior equipment in.avitalaspect of , , ,, ,
operational management.. . .
.For thesereasons, the.government hastaken stepstorevampthis policy. The
domestic markeireserve oninform.atics officially ended inOctober 1992. Anewlaw
allows fortheimportation ofcomputer equipment regardless ofwhether thesame
equipment isproduced inBrazil. Thisawalso. permits theformation of.joint ventures.
=A_acting Foreign Investment," Prosperity Paper Series, Sept. 1992.
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MEASURING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN THE PHILIPPINES
DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES OF DATA
FOREIGN direct investment is a long-term investment made by
nonresidents, typically but not always multinational corporations. It
includes new equity capital, reinvested earnings, and net borrowing
from a parent company or its affiliates. It involves establishing,
acquiring, or expanding an affiliated subsidiary corporation or branch
and implies full or partial control of the enterprise and physical
presence by foreign firms or individuals. An essential element of direct
investment is a continuing substantial interest in and an effective voice
in managing the real assetsof aforeign affiliated entity (Brewer 1991).
Where there is no substantial influence in the management of the
foreign enterprise, the investment isconsidered aportfolio investment.
Portfolio investment is defined as the purchase of host country bonds
or stocks by foreigners, without managerial control.
The IMF Balance-of-Payments Manual defines direct investment
as one that is made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise other
than that of the investor, with the purpose of having an effective voice
in the management of the enterprise. The IMF collects FDI flows on
•the basis of reports submitted by developing countries for the Fund's
annual BOP StatisticsYearbook. Because of the different sources and
methods used for estimating FDI changes, the data are not fully
comparable from country to country (IMF 1964).
The OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment
(1983) states that a direct investment enterprise is an incorporated or
an unincorporated enterprise in which asingle foreign investor either:
(1) controls 10percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power
of an incorporated enterprise or the equivalent of an
unincorporated enterprise unless it can be established that this74 ,9 Rafaelita A,Mercado-Aldaba
does not allow the investor an effective voice in the management
of the enterprise; or
(2) controls less than 10 percent of the ordinary voting shares or voting
power of the enterprise but has an effective voice in the
management of the enterprise.
An effective voice implies that the direct investor is able to influence
or participate in the management of the enterprise and does not imply
absolute control. The OECD collects FDI flows from the principal
capital-exporting industrial countries (DAC members) to developing
countries. In principle, the flows include reinvested earnings, but in
practice these are partly estimated and cannot always be reallocated to
individual recipient countries. FDI flows from the major oil exporting
countries or between other developing countries are not included
(Brewer 1991).
SOMEISSUES ANDCAVEATS IN USINGTHECURRENTLYAVAILABLE
FOREIGNDIRECT INVESTMENT DATA
A number of difficulties arise in attempting to measure foreign
direct investment in the Philippines. National statistics are inadequate,
some data are absent, and under-reporting is widespread. The FDI
flows reported by different government agencies are incomparable and
suffer from discrepancies owing to differences in their definition,
coverage, and collection methodology.
There are currently three local sources of data on foreign direct
investment flows. These are the: (1) Board of Investments (BOI), (2)
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and (3) Central Bank
(CB now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas [BSP]). The three agencies
regard foreign direct investment as the acquisition of equity as well as
control and managerial involvement in the operations of a direct
investment enterprise. The BOI and the SEC define foreign as
nonresidents as well as nonresident nationals (non-Philippine citizens
resident in the Philippines) and foreign-owned Philippine companies
investing in the Philippines. The CB includes only those investments
by resident firms that can be ascribed to nonresident owners.ForeignDirectInvestmentin thePhilippines I_ 75
BoardofInvestments (130I)
Column 3 of Appendix Table 1 shows foreign equity investments
approved by the BOI under various investment incentive laws from
1968 to May 1992. These approved foreign direct investments are
computed on the basis of the proposed amount of foreign equity
investments of new and existing projects submitted to the BOI by
new and existing corporations and partnerships. The following are
considered by BOI as foreign direct equity investments:
• cash participation: of foreign investors;
• capital equipment converted into equity;
• debts converted into equity;
• internally generated funds/retained earnings (dividends, royalties,
or fees) converted to equity.
The BOI uses the month of approval of the project as reference
period. Note that the BOI data set is based on approved foreign
investments rather than on investments actually implemented. It does
not include foreign investments arising from financial institutions as
well as from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Column 4 of Appendix Table 1 shows foreign equity investments
in the initial paid-up capital of newly registered corporations and
partnerships as well as the increases and decreases of foreign equity of
existing corporations and partnerships. The SEC data set is available
only from 1972 onward. The following are considered by SEC as
foreign equity investments:
• cash participation of foreign investors;
IN stocks of foreign investors;
II dividends converted into equity;
• foreign and locai loans converted into equity;
• capital equipment converted into equity;76 4 Rafaelita A Mercado-Aldaba
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AppendixTable1
Alternative DataSourcesfor the FDIFlowsto the Philippines
(in million USS)
CB CB





1972 32 46 4 -22
1973 55 80 5 146 64
1974 4 114 210 23 123 28
1975 98 57 8 122 125
1976 126 154 83 10 122 144
1977 209 111 46 5 183 216
1978 101 144 79 7 156 100
1979 8 330 103 116 199 20
1980 -107 128 236 64 230 -102
1981 172 107 252 36 307 175
1982 15 126 255 70 344 17
1983 105 -168 267 90 275 112
1984 9 167 234 31 147 17
1985 12 -250 131 80 247 17
1986 127 60 78 45 108 140
1987 307 85 167 77 96 326
1988 936 215 474 158 71 986
1989 563 332 805 225 203 643
1990 530 961 254 196 480
1991 771 256 415 654
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III foreign owned fixed assets such as real estate, buildings, machines,
and others.
The SEC computes foreign equity investments as the sum of the
following:
(a) initial capital of new domestic corporations and partnerships;
(b) increases in capital of existing domestic corporations and
partnerships;
(c) initial capital ofnew foreign corporations and regional headquarters
of multinational corporations;
(d) additional capital remitted by existing foreign corporations and
regional headquarters of multinational corporations.
This complete set of data is available only from 1989 onward.
From 1979 to 1988, the SEC figures refer only to foreign investment
in new and existing domestic corporations and partnerships, (a) and
(b) above, plus (c), initial capital of new foreign corporations and
regional headquarters of multinational corporations. Prior to 1979,
the SEC data referred only to (a), foreign equity investment in the
initial paid-up capital of newly registered domestic corporations and
partnerships. In view of these limitatiom in the scope and coverage of
foreign direct investment statistics,the SEC data become understated.
It was only in 1989 that SEC adopted a comprehensive coverage of
foreign direct investment. Like the BOI, the SEC does not cover
•financial institutions.
CentralBank
ForeignExchange Operationsand InvestmentsDepartment (FEOID).
All corporations and partnerships with foreign equity require CB
registration. The FEOID monitors all registered foreign equity
investment flows of corporations and partnerships including those
which are not monitored by the BOI and the SEC. Column 5 of
Appendix Table 1 shows FEOID data which represent CB-registered
foreign equity investments of corporations and partnerships.These are78 ,4 RafaelitaA. Mercado-Aldaba
based on the actual inward remittances made by foreign investors.The
following are considered by FEOID as,foreign equity investments:
• investments in cash;
• investments in kind: machinery, equipments, raw materials and
supplies;
• reinvestments: stocks,dividends, and royaltiesconverted into equity;
• debt to equity conversions (the computation was transferred to
the Debt Restructuring Office since 1986).
DepartmentofEconomicResearch_International(DER-I).The DER-
I computes foreign investment statistics which are included in the
BOP account. Foreign investment data are based on the transaction
reports of inward remittances by commercial banks. Reinvested
earnings, technical fees converted into equity, and imports converted
into investments are obtained from the FEOID. Debt converted into
equity are derived from the D1LO.The DER-I data include portfolio
investments and foreign exchange holdings. The following are
considered asforeign direct investment inflows:
• withdrawal of Philippine investments abroad: proceeds of sale of
assetsabroad, retirement of foreign bank holdings, stocks and other
securities and repatriation of equity investments in enterprises
abroad;
• new foreign investments in the Philippines: receipts forinvestments
to create or expand capital in a local firm including additional
capital contribution of foreign firms to their local branches and
subsidiaries;
• reinvested earnings of multinationals;
• debt converted into equity;
• technical fees converted into equity;
• imports converted into investments;
• foreign investment in issues of Philippine stocks, bonds, and Other
securities;
• bank inter-branch operations.Foreign DirectInvestment inthePhilippines i_ 79
The following are considered as foreign direct investment
outflows:
• withdrawal of foreign investments from the Philippines: proceeds
of sale of non-resident stocks/bond holdings in domestic
corporations remitted outward;
• capital for direct investment abroad: remittances of residents for
investment in a foreign firm;
• remittances of r_sidents for investment in a foreign firm;
• remittances of residents for investment in stocks and bonds of
foreign enterprises;
• bank inter-branch operations: remittances of local branches of
foreign banks to head offices as well as remittances of Philippine
banks to overseas branches.
Net direct investment flow, difference between inflows and
outflows,represents the net increase in foreign equity and non-equity
investments and the net increase in foreign exchange holdings of
domestic corporations and partnerships due to other financial
transactions.80 4 Rafaelita A. Mercado-Aldaba
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AppendixTable 2
Distribution of CB.Registered Foreign Direct Equity Investments by•Sector
Cumulative Flows (In US$•million) ••
• 1973 1974 1975 :1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Banks andOther
Finenclallnstltutlons 66,37 121.22 137.29 138.81 170.76 i91,84 220.88 240.98 269.92 288,72 301.60
Banks 58.96 92.46 104.98 103.32 120.48 127.19147.73 146.95 154.30 164.34 180.76
Otherfinancial
institutions 7.41 28,76 32,31 35.49 50,28 64.65 73,15 94,03 115,62 124.38 120.84
Manufacturing 57.23 9238 175.16 249.63 383.38474,00561,31 645.82 781.14 912.331057.58
Chemicals and
chemicalproducts 5.33 14,57 20,25 35,18 86,43 138,87 167,97 188,36 230,66 268,10 294,53
Food 3.52 13,26 21,01 23.01 49.03 57,79 82,29 88,38 133.6'1141.63 196,19
Metalandmetalproducts2.032.02 48.47 75.81 84.77 85.87 92.41 102.02 107.98 150.06 161,73
Textiles andgarments 7.27 10.19 14.29 16.88 20.90 28,12 32.05 36.23 40.52 49.95 5120
Transportequlpment 3,40 3.63 5.31 8,07 17.54 26,68 33.41 54.79 63.06 67.44 68,25
Peb'oleum andcoal 23,91 23.90 2422 28,24 2824 28.69 28.69 29.71 36.00 36,00 76.74
Machinery, apparatus,
appliances andsupplia s 1,52 4.03 5.41 9,59 19.93 23.14 28,09 38,90 45,40 61.29 64,29
Non-metallic mineral
producta 1.81 1,80 2.50 4,42 6.49 9.09 10.54 13.51 16.49 25.24 25.44
Others 8.44 18.98 33,70 45_43 '70,06 75.75 85,86 93.92 107.42 112.62 119.21
Mining 4,74 22,23 ,30.5257,56 58.97 79,55 142,05 225'.03 311,20 474,10 574.31
Petroleum andgas 0,14 0,39 0,81 20,71 22,03 41,27 103.33 183,30 25922 419,08,519,29
Copper 3.43 12.86 1922 26.05 26.09 27.31 27,32 30.32 3032 43.32 43.32
Iron ore 0.32' 7_66 8,66 8.79 8.64 8.88 9,30 9.30 9,32 9.32 9,32
Nickel 0.85 1.32 1,36 1;36 1,36 1.36 1,36 1.36 1.36 1,35 1.35
Others 0.00 0.00 0.47. 0.65 0.65 0.73 0,74 0.75 0,98 1.02 1.02
• , , ',, ,,, ,
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1984 19eS 1986 1987 1968 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
304.62 318.55 349.34 355.11 356.80 37342 397.94 428.56 465.01 513.93
181.89 188.30 217.84 222.94 224.00 229.59 237,54 249.47 250,41 260.98
122.73 130.25 131.50 132.17 132.80 143.83 160.40 179.11 204.60 252.95
1138.02 1276.821301,50 1349.20 1376.45 1484.38 1593.441892.35 2074.17 2330.53
311.22 338.52 366,88 385.57 394.43414.51 430.87 475.64 504.16 538.92
221.25 282.1.7282.44 287.64 289.25 296.78 312.39 32125 343.33 381.02
167,40 167,71 169.22 159,28 169.35 170.07 171.58 185.86 193.94 197,05
52.94 55.76 57.51 59.46 63.19 71.46 80.85 95.47 11229 118.61
76.89 10049 100.15 103.63 103.63 109.01 11635 138,32 178.32 191.76
76.74 78.96 81.23 82.31 82.31 82.31 82.31 94.87 94.87 223.97
67.88 72.46 73.81 78.86 81.32 120.89 155.46 324.41 378.94 404.74
33.04 33.50 34.49 34.49 34.49 35.75 49.03 50.30 51,86 67.27
133.66 147.25 135.77 147.74 156.48 174,60 194,53206.23 217.35 227.21
627.12 687.53 735.82 770.37 780.66 822.94 85320 883.74 895.97897.94
572.07 631.51 879.80 695.98 697.38 728.27 74125 742.73 742.73 742.73
43.32 43.32 43.32 4332 43.32 43.32 43.32 43,32, 43.32 43.32
9.32 9.32 9.32 9.32 9.32 932 9.32 9.32 9.32 9.32
136 1.36 1.36 1.36 136 1.38 2.19 2.19 2.82 2.82
1,05 2.02 2,02 20.39 29.28 40.67 57.12 86;18 97.78 99,7582 4 Rafaelita A. Mercado-Aldaba
Appendix Table 2continued
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1976 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Commerce 3.72 17.00 22.81 31.00 39.07 50.71 62.38 83.12 93.58 103.15 105.29
Wholesale 2.30 6,74 10.91 19,12 26.34 35.24 44.76 64.92 71.10 74.79 76.36
Realestate 1.32 8.98 9.17 9.44 10.23 10,63 11.33 11.85 16.13 22.01 22.87
Others 0.10 1.28 2.43 2.44 2.50 4,84 6.29 6.35 6.35 6.35 6.06
Services 0.26 0,84 6.63 15.20 20,45 23.59 28,01 32.70 65.58 76.20 89.38
Business 0.24 0,72 3.26 10,74 13.19 15.77 20.15 24.64 55.54 59.25 64.18
Others 0.02 0,12 3.37 4,46 7.26 7.82 7,86 8.06 10,04 16.95 2520
Public Utility 9.88 10.03 12,52 13.42 13.89 14.55 17.1.0 19.32 26.82 30.77 31.79
Communication 0.91 0.91 2.64 2.64 2,87 2.87 3.78 3,78 8.41 10.46 10.49
Land transport 8.94 9.09 9,09 9.09 9.09 9.09 9.09 9.09 9.10 10.43 10.43
Others 0.03 0.03 0.79 1.69 1.93 2.59 4.23 6,45 9.31 9.98 10,87
Agriculture, Fishery
endForestry 3.64 4.86 5.62 6.45 7.93 9.03 10.46 16.22 20.53 24.77 25.88
Agriculture 0.20 0.66 0.88 1.17 2.36 2.36 3.78 4.40 6.98 10.56 11.50
Others 3.44 4.20 4,74 528 5.57 6.67 6.68 11.82 13,55 14.21 14.38
Construction 0.12 0,16 0.19 0.39 0,84 8.35 8.72 17.19 18,42 21.05 20.87
Transport facilities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0,23 6.89 6.89 7,48 7.48 7.48 7.48
Infrastructure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 7,18 7.18 7.18 7,18
Others 0.12 0.16 0,19 0.23 0.61 1.46 1.83 2.63 3,76 6.39 6.21
Otlters 0.11 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0,50 0.50 0.50 0,50 0.50 0,50
TotalForeign
Equltylnvestmente 146.07 26922 390.94 512.96 695.79 852.121051,411280.88 1587.691931.59 2207.20
Source: Central Bank ofthePhilippines.
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1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
109.99 113,38 113,41 115.53 125.26153.53 17320 195.44 213.44 224.10
79.38 84.13 83.85 84.96 91,35 95.81 107.90 113.36 119.55 125,61
24,55 25.07 25,38 25.82 26,56 37.66 45,23 62.01 73.83 78.43
6.06 4.18 4.18 4.75 7.35 20.06 20.07 20.07 20.06 20.06
90.72 103.07 106.41 109.08 129.33 135.13 140.08 159,74 239.31 249.61
65.08 68,26 70.23 72.29 73.16 76.42 80,61 82.99 91.56 95.17
25.64 34.81 38.18 36.79 56.17 58.71 59.47 86.75 147.75 154.44
32.41 34,15 35.19 38.17 38.48 40.04 41,29 42,68 47.23 95,78
10.82 12.50 13.47 16.37 16.37 17.60 18.49 19.07 22.19 56.48
10.43 10.43 10,43 10.43 10,43 10.48 10,50 10.50 10.50 10,51
11.16 11.22 11.29 11.37 11.68 11.96 12,30 13,11 14.54 28.79
29.15 45.16 4522 45.75 46.87 47.20 53.24 53.76 54.01 54.28
14,18 29.64 38.27 38.80 39.50 39.50 43.17 43,69 43.82 44.01
14,97 15.52 6.95 6,95 7.37 7,70 10.07 10.07 10.19 10.27
21,22 21.49 21,51 21.57 21157 21.58 21,70 23.20 28,26 28.97
7.48 10.43 10.43 10,43 10.43 10.48 10,50 10.50 10.50 10.50
7.27 15.53 15.55 15.59 15.59 15.59 15.59 16.86 17.44 17.47
6.47 4,47 -4.47 -4.45 -4.45 -4.49 .4,39 -4.16 0.32 1,01
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0,50
2353.75 2600.65 2738.90 2805.282875.92 3078.72 3274.59 3689.99 4017:904395,64
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Appendix Table3
Distribution ofCB-Flegistered Forelgn Direct Equity Investments byCountry"
Cumulative Flows (InUS$million)
Country. • 1973 1974 1975 1979 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 lU2 1983
U.S.A, 93.85 146.37 189.10 245.87 343.64 450.80 578.90 699137855.611020.17 1216.29
Japao 14.11 39.82 92.02 124.23 151.12 164.20 186.00 215,11 234.10 294.96 311.29
Hongkong 1.94 3.89 8.38 14.25 26,84 34.61 39.90 55.28 94.43 106.39 120.82
Netherlands 0.24 1.72 1.72 9,50 12.39 14.14 16.07 21.22 33.83 92.07 10439
U.K, 24.03 24.63 28.67 • 29.69 32.83 34,87 38.00 43.09 67,47 80,27 78,27
Switzerland 1.13 3.29 6.41 9.09 14.94 20.20 25.54 32,73 39.81 46.41 47.75
Australia 0.46 5.76 9.49 12.86 17.23 19.74 24.25 31.41 35.77 39.20 43.25
Canada 0.50 23,16 33.84 40.12 48.47 46.76 50.34 50.51 44.74 45.82 4532
France 1,12 1.12 1,16. 1.23 1.52 1,58 7,77 17,85 36.94 38,08 41,45
Republic ofNauru 0;00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0,00 0,00 0.00 0.00 10,07 10,07 10,07
West Germany 0.27 0.87 0,91 1.68 4.55 7,65 9.59 13.40 18,16 21,09 24.78
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.51 233 3.66 4.37 11,10 11.60 12.76 13.73 23.52
Panama 0.27 0.27 1.26 2,04 9,11 10.38 11.69 12.42 14.14 18,31 19,00
Austria 0,00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0,00 3.01 3.80 8.42 15.24
Singapore 0.00 0.10 0.50 1.43 1.96 2.64 4,91 5.22 11.50 12,37 12.45
Denmark 0,32 0.44 0,73 0.84 2,41 3.22 5.62 7.38 7,75 13,63 14.09
Lummbourg 0.00 9.05 9,30 9.32 10.77 10.77 10.95 11.15 11.24 12.62 12.62
Malaysia 0.00 0,00 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.31 0.34 0,35 0.38 0,61 5,54
Bahamas 0,85 0.85 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20
NewHebrides 0,00 0.00 0.00 0,02 2.61 3.29 3.29 16.35 16.37 16.37 16,37
Bermuda 0.22 0.40 0.57 0,78 2,41 2,66 3.80 5.90 6,50 6.55 6.55
Sou_Korea 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.04 0,13 4,88 5.88 5.94 6.14 6.44 6.44
Taiwan 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 1.21 2.05 2.35 2.65 2.65 2,73 3.05
Other counVies 6.76 5.48 6.26 7.53 7.60 10.62 14.94 18.76 24.25 25.08 27.45
TOtDI Foreign
Equltylnvestment 145.07 269.22 390.94 512,96 695.79 852.12i05i.41 1290.88 1587,691931.59 2207.20
Soume: Central BankofthePhilippms.
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"1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1_ 1680 1991 1992 lg93
1305.82 1480,72 1551.78.1619.95 1649.12 1717.92 1770,68 1645.75 1901.82 1937.41
330.64 361.64 371.62 377.34 394,57 446.53 500.74 689.59 843.92 690.13
131.40 159.53 144.26 155.55 16925 185.01 20026 255.37 270.78 292.43
108.74 119.03 125.71 130,22 131.28 148.17 151,64 155.18 160.36 173,87
82.61 88,42 100,64 101.67 102.72 106,03 114.63 129.80 131.86 285.09
55,39 60.02 62.88 62.91 63.32 68.42 75.59 83.98 92,05 107.06
43,71 43.84 44,60 46.08 46.19 59,09 68.77 66.43 71,39 71,95
45.82 46.47 45,97 47.56 47.56 48,57 51.86 52.82 53.81 53.82
41,69 41.99 41,99 42.01 42.09 42.18 43.23 44.22 49,64 50.18
10.07 10.07 10,07 10.07 10.07 10.07 10.07 10,07 11.75 11.75
26.91 27.81 29.00 29.38 30.48 30.90 32.97 38,45 45,97 54.15
25.47 26.60 26.94 26.94 27.02 27.04 33.55 38.60 39,80 40,64
19.04 19.94 20.04 20,18 20.18 21.21 23,48 23,49 23.49 24,73
17.20 16,04 18.04 18.04 18.04 18.04 18.04 27.53 27.62 27.62
13.10 15.11 10.69 10.69 11,51 15.13 21.38 30.81 38.35 47.75
14.20 14.22 15.21 15.21 16.74 18.00 18.83 19.40 19.40 21.50
12,81 13,10 13.70 13.86 13.92 13,92 13.92 14,77 15.36 23,36
7.74 9.39 9.50 9.52 10.60 10.67 11.10 11.42 11.80 13.86
826 8.36 8.36 8,36 8.38 8,36 8,46 8.46 8.56 8.61
6.21 8.21 8.21 821 8.21 8.21 82.1 8.21 8.21 8.21
6.94 6.70 6.71 6.73 8,38 8.67 8_92 9,89 9,96 13.43
6.44 6.66 6.74 6.75 6,97 8.27 15,96 51.59 64.73 68.38
3.55 3.85 4.03 4.19 4.68 19.62 27.20 3333 36.18 40.31
27.99 30.93 31.31 53.86 34,48 38.69 47.22 40.83 81.10 129.41
2353.75 2600.65 2708.90 2805.26 2875.92 3076.72 3274,59 3689,99 4017,90 4395.64
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Appendix Table 4 •
Foreign Equity Investment
(In thousand pesos)
1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Agdculture, Forestry
andRshery 112,470 60,176 32,806 37,887 82,986 307,752 720,456 645,706 316,088 631,405 138,030 25,121
Mining 127,656 224,848 69,807 22,824 75 44,952 38,154 794,984 941,309 309,412 168,441 200,599
Man_dn 9 927,547 1,811,8753,154,33t 1,854,714 949,198 1,968,3307,627,364 12,194,968 _2,433,291 i3,021,0763,961,6328,834,363
Processed food 125,125 45,297 833,568 228,951 11,702 245,229 204265 208,107 338,481 538,563 18,620 199,782
Tex'dle and
garments 57,505 14,436 49,656 22,438 83,660 394,431 486,575 2,601,1293,157,362 515,806 177,085 215,893
Chemicals 428,945 56 474,658 119,621 481,514 272,652 2,260255 572,762 816,855 1243,779 97,771 82,676
Peb'oleurn products 3,227 0 69,231 26,501 0 75,229 800 1,075,600 200 5,801,600 0 27,275
Non-metallic E
mineral products 0 O 5,865 28,325 0 11,138 16,770 33,000 117,620 171,231 O O =_
Basic metal products >
andfabricated metal E





elec#ica_products 59,769 780,293 769,849 825,721 182,503 431,577 2,463,5994,272,2363,347,5811,583,9311,201,8584,087,871 crAppendixTable4 continued _ 0
1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1983 "
Transport 7,200 6,502 112,985 416,523 88,816 67,170 457,453 308,071 2,319,273 760,740 733,328 353,605














Farm Services 561,289 758,752 223,379 407,034 189,426 620,757 745,747 933,926 1,547,549 1,441,453 0 120,240
Financial
InstibJt[o=ts 7,385 12,456 -- 15,700 -- 4,696 -- 750 60,029 29,870 0 0
Construction
and InfTaStructure 12,618 6,656 36,645 400 20,209 23,234 3,606 6,455 1,194,420 604,099 21,977 0
Others 74,400 41,00_ 84,954 8,618 30,761 130,235 357,128 1,629,957 6,232,_ 4,481,252 2,889,634 5,202,393
V
Total 1,989,041 2,977,809 3,900,520 2,449,608 1,593,750 3,427,342 9,982,549 17,480,366 23,369,835 21,393,983 7,250,388 14,414,578
oo
Source: Board ofInvestments (BOI). "_